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RACE

E JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

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HAROLD R. ISAACS

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LEO KUPER

'Multi-Racialism' and Local Government in Tanganyika

CRANFORD PRATT

Overseas Students at Leicester University

J. E. T. ELDRIDGE

The French Racial Scene: North African Immigrants in France

VERNON WAUGHRAY

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(b) To consider and advise upon any proposals or endeavours to improve such relations, circumstances and conditions.

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Volume II No. 1 November 1960

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DuBOIS AND AFRICA

HAROLD R. ISAACS

The lifetime of William E. Burghardt DuBois, the most prolific of all American Negro writers and intellectuals, spans nearly the whole century back to Emancipation. He was born in 1868, had his first book published in 1896, and since then has gushed forth a great stream of words, passionate and biting and strong and angry words, poetic and mystical, great, florid and sweeping words, stately and ornate words, vague, cloudy and often mutually contradictory words, and, remarkably often, some deeply penetrating and piercingly prophetic words. His shelf of his own books includes sociological studies, essays and sketches, biography and autobiography, history, novels, and poetry. As editor of several different series of scholarly papers and pamphlets and of several periodicals, he fathered still more words, especially in the volumes of *Crisis*, which he founded in 1910 and edited until 1933, the period of his greatest personal impact on the affairs of Negroes in the United States. Never a successful leader or organiser or even a popular figure, DuBois with his words alone scratched deep, life-changing marks on the minds of a whole emergent generation of aspiring Negroes as they came to youth and maturity in the first three decades of this century.

DuBois' impact began in 1903 with the publication of *The Souls of Black Folk*, still his most famous and best-remembered book. In it he openly took issue with Booker T. Washington, until then the undisputed and unchallenged leader of American Negroes. DuBois called upon Negroes to abandon the posture of submissiveness and modest aspiration that Washington counselled them to hold, and urged them to stand up instead to fight for their rights as men and citizens in the American society. Instead of the limited system of education-for-work that Washington promoted at Tuskegee, DuBois called upon Negroes to reach for the heights of all learning, and to produce that famous 'talented tenth' to lead Negroes to the full enjoyment of freedom. In 1905, DuBois and a group of co-thinkers launched the Niagara movement to promote these aims, and then joined with a group of white liberals in 1910 to found the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, becoming its research director and editor of its organ, *Crisis*.

In the columns of *Crisis* for the next 23 years DuBois made himself the most eloquent tribune of the fight for civil rights and equality of opportunity for Negroes, lashing, arguing, cajoling, pontificating, fighting white injustices with slashing journalism, savage wit, and fierce polemics. He fought black weaknesses with every weapon he could grasp. He fostered pride in Negro history, Negro achievements, and even in Negro good looks, coaxed out artistic talent, ran issues devoted to college graduates, budding writers and artists, and beautiful babies,

and ever and always set forth in his own articles and editorials, his own strong views of issues big and small in the Negro's fight for equality. In addition, almost as an extra-curricular activity to which even his Negro readers paid scant attention, DuBois organised between 1919 and 1927 four Pan-African Conferences in an unsuccessful attempt to give world scope to the black man's struggle for freedom from the oppression of the white. But his editorial performance was spectacular enough, pushing *Crisis* from an initial subscription of 10,000 to a top of 104,000, a figure small in looks but large in meaning because it included all Negroes who had set their faces upward and were pushing at the barriers for better education, political freedom, and better economic opportunity. It was a stormy editorship, because DuBois, a prickly and vain man, was no easy associate, whether he was as wholly right as he always believed himself to be, or impressively wrongheaded, as he often was. His object was to influence people, not to make friends, and he succeeded to a remarkable degree. DuBois has written, sometimes sadly but more often complacently, of his special aloofness, and especially his aloofness from any personal contact with whites. From his earliest days, he preferred to accept being glassed in—a figure of speech he has himself used. It was a withdrawal he liked to see as proud and austere, but it was really much more like the shrinking of a porcupine inside his armour of rising spines. A biographer will one day pursue this thread of self-separation through all the reams of DuBois' writing about himself and about the world. It will help to explain why, when he reached a time of despair after 30 years' struggle for integration and equality, he reverted to a programme of self-imposed isolation for Negroes, a plan for growth-within-the-ghetto that took him all the way back into the shadow of Booker T. Washington.

In the same way, a biographer who seeks to put this man's parts together again will have to see the links and the spaces between his persistent élitism, his delight in elegance and aristocracy, his half-digested Marxism, his belief in power and authority and in a 'talented tenth' to lead the slower-moving mass, the links between all this and his slow gravitation toward the international Communist movement, ending in the last decades of his long life in a close embrace, indeed, a marriage, with totalitarian Communist world power. Over most of his active years, DuBois' attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the Communist party were conditioned, like everything else in his life, by considerations of race. He held the Communist Party in rather scornful disdain, most of the time, for its gross ineptitude in the 'Negro question', but he warmed early to the Soviet Union for its anti-colonialism and for what he believed to be its abdication of the colour line. In the twenty-seven years since he left the editorship of *Crisis*, DuBois moved first for a confused interval toward self-segregation and then, more and more steadily, into the camp of the Communists. In doing so, he drifted into greater and greater isolation from Negroes in general, from most of those who still admired him for the great days of his past, and indeed, from any

significant contact with American or Western society. It is hardly accidental that DuBois finally turned, for his compensations and realisations, to the emergent world of Communist power only when he could begin to see in it the verification of some of his prophecies of doom for the Western white world, the instrument for the defeat, on the largest possible scale, of the Anglo-Saxon dominators who were always his prime foes. In return, the Communist empire has given DuBois the eminence and recognition of which he felt deprived in his homeland, and even among his fellow-Negroes in these last decades of his long life. In 1958-59, DuBois made a long journey across the Soviet half-world from Prague to Peking, and he was showered with honours by Communist universities and leaders in country after country. Responding to encomiums offered on his 91st birthday on 23 February 1959, in a speech broadcast over the Peking radio, DuBois gave his thanks and he said: 'In my own country for nearly a century, I have been nothing but a nigger.'[1]

Even a thumbnail introduction of W. E. B. DuBois stretches from paragraphs into pages and thereby illustrates some of the difficulties of our task. He has already been the subject of a first book-length biography[2] which barely begins the task of telling his long story. I want here to try to show how DuBois has dealt with the particular matter of the Negro relationship to Africa, for on Africa, he centred some of his most personal and some of his largest dreams. In the recreation of Africa's past he saw the means of regaining for all Negroes the pride that he clung to so strongly in himself. For the reconstruction of Africa's own present and future, he produced his vision of Pan-Africanism in a world of colonies reconquered by the non-white races from their white overlords. On these subjects he hammered away at his audience year after year, re-educating some, stirring a few, but meeting most of the time that deep unresponsiveness to Africa which not even he, alone, could overcome.

Nor, in dealing with DuBois and Africa, is it possible to deal any less with DuBois and race, for, as he has put it himself:

> In my life the chief fact has been race—not so much scientific race, as that deep conviction of myriads of men that congenital differences among the main masses of human beings absolutely condition the individual destiny of every member of a group. Into the spiritual provincialism of this belief I have been born and this fact has guided, embittered, illuminated and enshrouded my life.[3]

When DuBois made the familiar boyhood discovery that to be a Negro in a white-dominated world was to be despised and rejected, his own reaction was to cut himself off for life from all but the most superficial personal contact with white people. But the problems of whiteness and non-whiteness were part of some of the deepest issues of human society in times that were, as always, out of joint. Even while holding himself

[1] *New York Times*, 5 March 1959.
[2] Francis L. Broderick, *W. E. B. DuBois, Negro Leader in a Time of Crisis* (Stanford, 1959).
[3] W. E. B. DuBois, *Dusk of Dawn* (New York, 1940), pp. 139–40.

haughtily aloof behind that famous 'veil' of which he wrote so often, DuBois could put his gifts, glands, and powers to work to set things right, not for himself (he was above it, he always said) but for all. And this is what he set out to do. All that he has been and done in his life has been aimed at settling the score created by his racial identity and doing so in the largest possible arenas.

No matter what his subject or format, DuBois has been writing autobiography all his life, and yet has always managed to brush quickly past the episodes of his childhood that precipitated him into his life's struggle. He was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, and grew up there in a fatherless home. He shared the schooltime and playtime of his early years with white boys from the middle-class upper crust of the burgeoning industrial society of that small mill town. His natural impulse was to gravitate toward the top. He says he was in and out of their homes, 'except a few immigrant New Yorkers, of whom none of us approved'. And again: 'I cordially despised the poor Irish and South Germans who slaved in the mills, and annexed the rich and well-to-do as my natural companions. Of such'—he adds self-appreciatively—'is the kingdom of snobs!' His discovery that he in his turn was also despised came, he says, more slowly.

> Very gradually,—I cannot now distinguish the steps, though here and there I remember a jump or a jolt—but very gradually I found myself assuming quite placidly that I was different from other children. At first I think I connected the difference with a manifest ability to get my lessons rather better than most and to recite with a certain happy, almost taunting, glibness, which brought frowns here and there. Then, slowly, I realized that some folks, a few, even several, actually considered my brown skin a misfortune; once or twice I became painfully aware that some human beings even thought it a crime. I was not for a moment daunted,—although, of course, there were some days of secret tears—rather I was spurred to tireless effort. If they beat me at anything, I was grimly determined to make them sweat for it! Once I remember challenging a great, hard farmer-boy to battle, when I knew he could whip me; and he did. But ever after, he was polite.
>
> As time flew I felt not so much disowned and rejected as rather drawn up into higher spaces and made part of a mightier mission. At times I almost pitied my pale companions, who were not of the Lord's anointed and who saw in their dreams no splendid quests of golden fleeces.[1]

Unsurprisingly, it was a girl who brought on the first great climax in the discovery of his Negro-ness and set him on his way. In a schoolhouse party one day, the youngsters were gaily exchanging visiting cards and all was merry until one girl—a newcomer—'peremptorily, with a glance', refused Will DuBois' card.

> Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart and life and

[1] W. E. B. DuBois, *Darkwater, Voices From Within the Veil* (New York, 1920), pp. 11–12.

> longing, but shut out from their world by a vast veil. I had thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky and great wandering shadows . . .[1]

In another version of this episode, describing his flight from the pettiness of individual slights and insults to the larger shapes of things beyond, he gives it the literal form of a race to a hilltop:

> Then I flamed! I lifted my chin and strode off to the mountains, where I viewed the world at my feet and strained my eyes across the shadow of the hills.[2]

His straining eyes began then to see all the other Negroes in America, then all black men everywhere, and, before long, all the non-whites in the world. He stretched his view to all the great continental arenas, America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and even, on some of his steeper rhetorical flights, right up into the unwalled and gateless spaces of heaven itself.

From his hilltop, DuBois linked himself to the whole world of non-whiteness. In the beginning this meant regaining contact with Negroes. From the isolation of Great Barrington he did not go at first to Harvard, as he had dreamed of doing, but was content enough ('after a twinge, I felt a strange delight') to be deflected to Fisk where he came into the company of other Negroes.

> I was thrilled to be for the first time among so many people of my own color or rather of such various and such extraordinary colors, which I had only glimpsed before, but who it seemed were bound to me by new and exciting and eternal ties . . . Above all for the first time I saw beautiful girls. At my home among my white school mates there were a few pretty girls; but either they were not entrancing or because I had known them all my life I did not notice them; but at the first dinner I saw opposite me a girl of whom I have often said, no human being could possibly have been as beautiful as she seemed to my young eyes that far-off September night of 1885.[3]

At Fisk he not only related himself to other Negroes and especially to beautiful young Negro girls, but, with the same romantic idealism about race, he also, for the first time, embraced Africa.

His great-grandmother ('black, little, and lithe') used to 'croon a heathen melody' to her children, and the song came down in the family to become 'the only one direct cultural connection' DuBois ever had as a child to his African background, But his upbringing was 'not African so much as Dutch and New England', and he came to Africa only after discovering that New England rejected him. He says clearly:

> My African racial feeling was then purely a matter of my own later learning and reaction; my recoil from the assumptions of the whites; my experience in the South at Fisk. But it was none the less real and a large determinant of my life and character. I felt myself

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[1] W. E. B. DuBois, *Souls of Black Folk* (Chicago, 1903), p. 2.
[2] *Darkwater*, p. 11.
[3] *Dusk of Dawn*, p. 24.

> African by 'race' and by that token was African and an integral member of the group of dark Americans who were called Negroes.[1]

When I interviewed the aged but crisp DuBois in his Brooklyn home, I pressed him a little to look back down the years all the way to Great Barrington to see what else about Africa might have brushed him in his boyhood. He first again mentioned the African song that had come down in his family. No, he did not remember reading about Africa then, though he devoured everything the Great Barrington library had on its shelves. 'The books I remember taking out were books on English history and such. If I sought books about Africa there, I doubt that I would have found any.'

And in school? I asked.

'I was tremendously incensed that there was nothing in the textbooks about Africa,' he said. 'Only pictures of white men, no pictures of coloured or black men, and this began to get me curious.'

Did he mean, I asked, that no pictures of people accompanied the mentions of Africa in those first textbooks? And here DuBois came up with his own report of the familiar experience:

'We did get pictures of the races of man,' he said: 'a white man, a Chinese mandarin, and the savage Negro. That was what the class got and it made me especially sensitive. I did not recognize those pictures in the book as being my people.'

'Africa', he went on, 'was not a major thing in my thought nor any part of my experience. My first real acquisition of any of this was at Fisk, where they had the beginnings of an African museum, some pieces like that one up there'—and he pointed to a small carved figure of stone on his mantelpiece. 'But Africa still never came to the centre of my thought. It was something in the background. There was always a lack of interest, a neglect, a resentment at being classed as Africans when Negroes felt that they were Americans. Interest in Africa did not begin with anyone until after 1880 or so . . . I did not myself begin actively to study Africa until 1908 or 1910. Franz Boas really influenced me to begin studying this subject and I began really to get into it only after 1915.'

DuBois' tie to Africa remained pure racial romance, whether he related to it as an individual, as a propagandist for the greatness of the Negro's past, or as a geopolitician of race, a dreamer of great dreams of Pan-Africanism as part of a general re-emergence of the world of non-whites brought together by their common history of slavery, discrimination, and insult. All of this appears together in a single passage in his 1940 autobiography:

> As I face Africa, I ask myself: what is it between us that constitutes a tie that I can feel better than I can explain? Africa is of course my fatherland. Yet neither my father nor my father's father ever saw Africa or knew its meaning or cared overmuch for it. My mother's folk were closer and yet their direct connexion, in culture and race, became tenuous; still, my tie to Africa is strong. On this

[1] *Dusk of Dawn*, p. 114.

> vast continent were born and lived a large portion of my direct ancestors going back a thousand years and more. The mark of their heritage is upon me in color and hair . . . But one thing is sure and that is the fact that since the fifteenth century these ancestors of mine and their other descendants have had a common history, have suffered a common disaster, and have one long memory. The actual ties of heritage between the individuals of this group vary with the ancestors that they have in common and many others, Europeans and Semites, perhaps Mongolians, certainly American Indians. But the physical bond is least and the badge of color relatively unimportant save as a badge; the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa, but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas. It is this unity that draws me to Africa[1].

DuBois could write that the 'physical bond' was 'least' and that the 'badge of color was relatively unimportant', while nourishing for all his life a near-obsession with colour. He was hardly ever able to describe anyone without stress upon it, or to deal with many values far detached from it. On the lighter brown side himself, he early set his face against the Negro colour caste. In his Harvard days he 'hotly championed the inclusion of two black schoolmates whose names were not usually on the invitation list to our social affairs'. In Europe he turned away the proffered love of a white girl and back home even ended a courtship with a Negro girl who 'looked quite white' and therefore might create misunderstandings that would embarrass him. In his writing he began to stress blackness as a positive virtue, and the first time in his life that he actually set foot in Africa, he positively swooned on its 'black bosom'.

This journey took place at the end of 1923, and William E. Burghardt DuBois returned to his ancestral homeland as, of all things, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the President of the United States to the inauguration of the President of Liberia. I must regretfully not pause for more than a breath here over the sad, comic, and ironic inwardness of this episode as described, fully and lovingly, by DuBois himself.[2] There is first a sharp and wonderfully revealing vignette of DuBois on shipboard, a day out of Africa, the land of so many dreams, reading his favourite author. His diary note, full text: 'Tomorrow—Africa! Inconceivable! As yet no sight of land, but it was warm and we rigged deck chairs and lay at ease. I have been reading that old novel of mine—it has points. Twice we've wired Liberia. I'm all impatience.' Then at the landing came the nearly orgasmic ecstasy he felt in his role, in the trappings and protocol and the snap of his military escort, the pomp of his reception at the Presidential Mansion, the bows of the assembled diplomatic corps, and the reading of his address as all respectfully listened. In calling this experience perhaps

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[1] *Dusk of Dawn*, pp. 116–117.
[2] *Crisis*, 27:6, pp. 248–51, April 1924; *Dusk of Dawn*, pp. 122–5.

his greatest hour, DuBois suddenly shows us a small man, shrunken inside the vestments of his golden words.

He goes on, from the story of the brief spurt of his enjoyment of the sensations of sovereignty, to the gushing, melting passion of joy in his reunion with the land of his black ancestry.

> The spell of Africa is upon me. The ancient witchery of her medicine is burning my drowsy, dreamy blood. This is not a country, it is a world, a universe of itself and for itself, a thing Different, Immense, Menacing, Alluring. It is a great black bosom where the spirit longs to die. It is life so burning, so fire-encircled that one bursts with terrible soul inflaming life. One longs to leap against the sun and then calls, like some great hand of fate, the slow, silent, crushing power of almighty sleep—of Silence, of immovable Power beyond, within, around. Then comes the calm. The dreamless boat of midday stillness at dusk, at dawn, at noon, always. Things move—black shiny bodies, perfect bodies, bodies of sleek unearthly poise and beauty. Eyes languish, black eyes—slow eyes, lovely and tender eyes in great dark formless faces . . .[1]

DuBois walked out into the 'bush' to visit a village:

> How shall I describe it? Neither London, nor Paris, nor New York has anything of its delicate precious beauty. It was a town of the Veys and done in cream and pale purples, still, clean, restrained, tiny, complete. It was no selfish place, but the central abode of fire and hospitality, clean-swept for wayfarers . . . They gave our hands a quick soft grasp and talked easily. Their manners were better than those of Park Lane or Park Avenue. Oh, much better and more natural. They showed us breeding . . . These folk have the leisure of true aristocracy, leisure for thought and courtesy, leisure for sleep and laughter. They have time for their children—such well-trained, beautiful children with perfect, unhidden bodies . . . Come to Africa and see well-bred and courteous children, playing happily and never sniffling or whining . . .[2]

He never saw a quarrel or fight, 'nor met with a single lewd gesture'. He saw 'no impudent children or smart and overbearing young folk', and found everyone, old and young, uniformly polite and full of deference, tolerance, and affection for each other. And always recurring, his special duet on bodies, one part in tropical rhapsody:

> I believe that the African form in color and curve is the beautifullest thing on earth; the face is not so lovely, though often comely with perfect teeth and shining eyes—but the form of the slim limbs, the muscled torso, the deep full breasts![3]

And the other, in shrill New England tenor:

> I have read everywhere that Africa means sexual license. Perhaps it does. Most folk who talk sex frantically have all too seldom revealed their source material. I was in West Africa only two months,

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[1] *Crisis*, 27:6, p. 274, April 1924.
[2] *Dusk of Dawn*, pp. 126–7.
[3] *Crisis*, 27:6, p. 273.

> but with both eyes wide. I saw children quite naked and women usually naked to the waist—with bare bosom and limbs. And in those sixty days I saw less of sex dalliance and appeal than I see daily on Fifth Avenue. This does not mean much, but it is an interesting fact.[1]

So much of DuBois is here in this brief African interlude: the élitist gratified by the rituals of power, the man drawn by deep full breasts, the day-dreamer won by languor, the poet swooning on Africa's black bosom, the rhapsodist celebrating colour, curve, and form, the aristocrat pleased by dignity, deference, order and gentility, the Puritan alert to any non-poetic license. But never submerged in any of these is DuBois the race propagandist, always trying to carry his readers with him toward a better opinion of their past and present links to Africa and thereby toward a better opinion of themselves.

To this same end, he also took the work done by various scholars and writers in history, art, and archaeology to resurrect the African past, and in book after book, alongside his autobiographical fragments, his discourses on race issues and world politics, his exhortations and his polemics, he kept filling in and enlarging the tapestry of the Negro's remoter past, painting in great strokes of majestic achievement and prideful memory. In this work, DuBois was content to try to be the populariser of the most favourable findings of others. But for his own preserve he took the intermingling of world politics, history and race, and he entered upon it with full zest, swinging his pen like a sword, sweeping his words like plumes over the whole range of the white man's depredations on the non-white world, all the history that began with the slave trade out of Africa starting some 400 years ago and coming to its close in Africa only now. For DuBois, the study of history was the study of the geopolitics of race.

* * *

In 1903, barely twenty years after he had raced, hurt, to that Massachusetts hilltop and strained his eyes toward farther horizons, W. E. B. DuBois opened an essay with these words:

> The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.[2]

He had by now taken into his widening view all the black men of America, he had explored their history and something of their present state. He had looked beyond them to the black men of Africa and to all the non-whites in the rest of the world, and their common plight under the rule of the white master race, and in a deep lunge of intellect and intuition, he had enlarged the issue to its full global dimensions.

When the First World War came, DuBois saw it as a massive and bloody collision between rivals for the spoils of the earth. The issue

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[1] *Dusk of Dawn*, pp. 127–8.
[2] *Souls of Black Folk*, p. 13.

was world power, and a major issue in power had become the distribution of colonies in Asia and Africa. DuBois had already taken half a hold on the socialist view which saw the fulcrum of affairs as economic and the main division in society running between exploiters and toilers. But he also saw that white toilers were just as committed as white capitalists to the maintenance of the colour line in all its brutishness, indeed, often more so, and this kept him for years from coming closer to any of the forms of socialist doctrine professed by white politicians. On the world scene, as anyone could see, the exploiters were white, and the toilers non-white, and around its world system of strategy, power, and political economy, Europe itself had draped an elaborate racist ideology, declaring, as DuBois put it, that it was 'the duty of white Europe to divide up the darker world and administer it for Europe's good'. This was rationalised by the belief that the 'darker peoples are dark in mind as well as in body' and therefore 'born beasts of burden for white folks'. For their profitable toil, they were only to be paid what they—held nearly worthless—were worth.

> Such degrading of men is as old as mankind (he wrote) and the invention of no one race or people. Ever have men striven to conceive of their victims as different from the victors, endlessly, in soul and blood, strength and cunning, race and lineage. It has been left, however, to Europe and to modern days, to discover the eternal world-wide mark of meanness—color![1]

This marking of the colour line gave DuBois a hard and sometimes twisting path, but it also led him, often, to the heart of things:

> This theory of human culture and its aims has worked itself through the warp and woof of our daily thought with a thoroughness that few realize. Everthing great, good, efficient, fair, and honorable is 'white'; everything mean, bad, blundering, cheating, and dishonorable is 'yellow'; a bad taste is 'brown'; and the devil is 'black'. The changes of this theme are continually rung in picture and story, in newspaper heading and moving picture, in sermon and school book, until, of course, the King can do no wrong—a White Man is always right and a Black Man has no rights which a white man is bound to respect. There must come the necessary despisings and hatreds of these savage half-men, this unclean canaille of the world—these dogs of men. All through the world this gospel is preaching. It has its literature, it has its priests, it has its secret propaganda and above all—it pays ![2]

Of large events it gave him a much clearer view than most people had at the time, in 1920, when he wrote these prophetic words:

> The World War was primarily the jealous and avaricious struggle for the largest share in exploiting darker races. As such it is and must be but the prelude to the armed and indignant protests of these despised and raped peoples. Today Japan is hammering on the

[1] *Darkwater*, p. 42.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 44.

> door of justice, China is raising her half-manacled hands to knock next, India is writhing for the freedom to knock, Egypt is sullenly muttering, the Negroes of South and West Africa, of the West Indies, and of the United States are just awakening to their shameful slavery. Is, then, this war the end of wars ? Can it be the end, so long as sits enthroned even in the souls of those who cry peace, the despising and robbing of darker peoples ? If Europe hugs this delusion, then this is not the end of world war—it is but the beginning ![1]

Better vision, one must add, than a great many people had had (or still have!) now that we have gone through so much that DuBois here, 40 years ago, so clearly foresaw.

* * *

Through his racial window on the world, DuBois saw some things hard and clear, but some were out of focus, others out of sight, and often his view was downright myopic. Like many more common men, he built some of his prejudices out of his vanity and out of scanty personal experience. His schooltime in Berlin gave him a curiously affectionate view of culture in Hohenzollern Germany. Because the French showed greater subtlety in applying the colour line both at home and in the colonies, and showed some greater readiness to recognise merit in black men (even if it was only their merit in serving their white masters or offering up their lives for the metropolitan power in war), DuBois took a much kindlier view of French whiteness than of most others. He was tiresomely proud of his own Dutch and French ancestors, and especially of the suggestion of Huguenot nobility and wealth in the latter. He described himself as being born 'with a flood of Negro blood, a strain of French, a bit of Dutch, but, thank God! no "Anglo-Saxon"!'. DuBois had started out to be a social scientist, to accept the harsh discipline of the truth-seeker in the belief that the truth would make men free. But when he felt driven to become a race propagandist, his truth-seeking became more selective and his truths more supple. Negro-ness and blackness not only had to be made acceptable; they had to be romanticised. Race doctrine that was anathema when it was white became eloquent when it was black: 'I believe in the Negro race, in the beauty of its genius, the sweetness of its soul . . .' The enslavement of black men by black and brown in the times before the white incursions into Africa became under his pen 'the mild domestic slavery of the African tribes and of the Arabs and the Persians'. The Moslem slave trade in black Africans was mitigated in his eyes by the thought that it was intended to supply soldiers and servants to a leisure class, not profit-making labour to a 'commercial class'.[2] And when virtual slavery was found still being practised in modern Liberia, DuBois brushed rather lightly over the facts as they

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
[2] W. E. B. DuBois, *The World and Africa* (New York, 1947), p. 77; W. E. B. DuBois, *Black Folk Then and Now* (New York, 1939), pp. 130–1.

were established in 1930 by a League of Nations Commission of Enquiry.[1]

DuBois' colour astigmatism appears even more strongly in the way he dealt over the years with the phenomenon of Japan. After exulting, like non-whites all over the world, over Japan's defeat of Russia in 1905, DuBois had wishfully seen Japan as the striking edge of the coloured world against the white. He remained defensive about Japan's transformation into an aggressive imperialist power on its own terms. He saw its predatory assaults on China as part of coloured Japan's resistance to the white West. He insisted that Japan's attacks on China were a prelude to a Japanese-Chinese bloc against the white world, and as late as the Manchurian invasion, in 1931, was seeing it as Japan's effort to save China from enslavement by Europe and America.[2] In his 1940 book, *Dusk of Dawn*, DuBois managed to avoid any mention at all of the war going on between Japan and China, and in 1947, in *The World and Africa*, he gave this remarkable capsule summary of the events just past: 'Japan aroused Asia, and by attacking America thus furnished the one reason, based on race prejudice, which brought America immediately into the war.'[3]

DuBois poured his racial fantasies, his view of the world, his obsession with colour, his public judgements and his secret hopes, and some of his own innermost dreams into a novel he called *Dark Princess*, published in 1928. It is one of the most forgotten of his many books, and as a work of literature deserves no other fate. But as a biographical item, it is very much worth dwelling upon here for a bit, for it tells us much about our man and about our subject.

His story is of a young American Negro, frustrated by prejudice in his effort to become a doctor, who thereupon quits America for Europe. 'I'm through,' Matthew Towns writes to his mother. 'I cannot and will not stand America longer. I'm off.' In Berlin he strolls into the Viktoria Café on the Unter der Linden, looking exactly as the young DuBois himself has been described in his own Berlin days, wearing a new suit with 'his newest dark crimson tie that burned with the red in his smooth dark face; he carried cane and gloves and he had walked into this fashionable café with an air'. Here he encounters the Princess, whose colour filled his eyes even before the rest of her beauty came into focus:

> First and above all came that sense of color: into this world of pale yellowish and pinkish parchment, that absence or negation of color, came, suddenly, a glow of golden brown skin. It was darker than sunlight and gold; it was lighter and livelier than brown. It was a living, glowing crimson, veiled beneath brown flesh. It called for no light and suffered no shadow, but glowed softly of its own inner radiance.

He meets her by knocking down a white American who tries to annoy

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[1] *Black Folk Then and Now*, p. 292; cf. Broderick, *W. E. B. DuBois*, pp. 134–5.
[2] Broderick, *W. E. B. DuBois*, pp. 133–5.
[3] *The World and Africa*, p. 14.

her. She turns out to be Her Royal Highness the Princess Kautilya of Bwodpur, India, who promptly invites him home for dinner. His fellow guests are a Japanese nobleman, two Indians, two Chinese, an Egyptian and his wife, all richly dressed, all obviously people of high status and importance. Matthew 'could not keep his eyes from continually straying sidewise to his hostess. Never had he seen color in human flesh so regally set: the rich and flowing grace of the dress out of which rose so darkly splendid the jeweled flesh.'

'You will note, Mr. Towns,' she says, 'that we represent here much of the Darker World. Indeed, when all our circle is present, we represent all of it, save your world of Black Folk.'

The group turns out to be the executive committee of a world movement of the 'Darker Peoples'. They had just been debating whether to include American or African blacks, some of them questioning the 'ability, qualifications, and real possibilities of the black race in Africa or elsewhere'. Matthew hotly defends his race and proves its genius and its desire for freedom by suddenly singing the spiritual, 'Let My People Go'. The Egyptian, who had scornfully questioned the merit of 'the black rabble of America', is silenced. 'Pan-Africa belongs logically with Pan-Asia,' decrees the Princess, 'and for that reason Mr. Towns is welcomed tonight'. So Pan-Africa, in the person of Mr. Towns-DuBois, joins the circle.

Matthew goes back to America and there almost falls prey to utter corruption when the Dark Princess appears to rescue him from this threatened suicide of his soul. He and the Princess then live a brief idyll in a Chicago slum. The Princess tells of her dream of the 'substitution of the rule of dark men in the world for the rule of white, because the colored peoples were the noblest and the best bred'. Matthews tries to broaden her view, arguing for the admission of 'the masses of men of all races who might be the best of men simply imprisoned by poverty and ignorance'. Indeed, throughout, DuBois' hero valiantly tries to keep the broader human mass in view, just as he continues to argue for peaceful means as against violence; he has a hard time on both counts. He must also convince her that the black men have their rightful part in the great times to come and are not, as her friends have charged, 'only slaves and half-men'.

In the end Kautilya's doubts are resolved and she writes to Matthew, in language that oddly mingles the accents of DuBois' global racism and the Communist Party's doctrine, brand new in 1928, of 'self-determination in the Black Belt', the idea of a Negro Republic across some part of the American South. Here is Kautilya's message:

> You are not free in Chicago or New York. But here in Virginia you are at the edge of a black world. The black belt of the Congo, the Nile, and the Ganges reaches by way of Guiana, Haiti, and Jamaica, like a red arrow, up into the heart of white America. Thus I see a mighty synthesis: you can work in Africa and Asia right here in America if you work in the Black Belt. For a long time I was puzzled . . . but now I know. I am exalted, and with

> my high heart comes illumination. I have been sore bewildered by this mighty America, this ruthless, terrible, intriguing Thing. My home and heart is India. Your heart of hearts is Africa. And now I see through the cloud. You may stand here, Matthew, here, halfway between Maine and Florida, between the Atlantic and the Pacific, with Europe in your face and China at your back; with industry in your right hand and commerce in your left and the Farm beneath your steady feet; and yet be in the Land of the Blacks.

It develops that the Princess has not, as he thought, gone home to India, but to his mother's cabin, in Virginia, to have Matthew's baby. He is summoned there by an East Indian courier in rich garb who bows low before him in his South Side tenement room. With her summons comes a prophecy:

> The great central committee of Yellow, Brown, and Black is finally to meet. You are a member. The High Command is to be chosen. Ten years of preparation are set. Ten more years of final planning and then five years of intensive struggle. In 1952, the Dark World goes free—whether in Peace and fostering Friendship with all men, or in Blood and Storm—it is for Them—the Pale Masters of today—to say.

Matthew flies back to Virginia and walks up the long path to his mother's cabin, and there standing by the old black tree is the Princess, dressed in her royal robes and great jewels, blood rubies, silk, and gold, and in her arms is their baby, the new Maharajah of Bwodpur. In a wonderful touch that is like a sudden and unexpected chuckle from the author, Matthew's mother produces a local preacher to marry them 'to make this little man an hones' chile'. So there in the curve of a Virginia hill they are joined with a proper Christian knot, while from among the trees in the forest the royal retinue of Indians hails the pair and the princeling: 'King of the Snows of Gaurisankar ! Protector of Ganga the Holy ! Incarnate Son of the Buddha ! Grand Mughal of Utter India ! Messenger and Messiah to all the Darker Worlds !'

Once again, much—if not all—of DuBois appears in his book, his thoughts and fantasies about the world, and his dreams about himself, and about love and about fulfilment. Here are his angers and confusions, his colour fixation, his racism, his belief in an aristocracy of talent and, more secretly, in an aristocracy of blood, really only the blood of dark-skinned men. Here too is his dream of liberation, a day of stern justice and reckoning but not—he struggles to believe—of vengeance. He dreams of it not as Armageddon, but salvation, the rescue of the white world from self-destruction and the redirection of its energies, under the generous aegis of the new elect, toward true human advancement. He presents it all with but small saving touches of a restraining intelligence and humanity, and, occasionally, prophetic insight. Written in 1928, his prophecy that the 'Dark World' would go free by 1952 was not bad, not bad at all.

But in our present context, the most striking thing about this whole fanciful construction is the virtual absence from it of *Africa*. It is included as a place name, but the only 'African' who actually appears

is an Egyptian, who has to be rapped to order for prejudice against black skins. The whole black race gets admitted to the circle of the Darker World only because young Towns-DuBois, with gloves and cane, rescues a beauteous brown princess from a white American wolf in a Berlin café, and she, Pan-Asia, welcomes him, Pan-Africa, to her side. This singular personification was not an accident nor was it merely a literary convenience, for Pan-Africa was the other shape of DuBois' dream, and while he dreamed it for Africa's fulfilment, what he really saw in it was his own.

* * *

DuBois was a romantic racist, but through all the ups and downs and twists and turns of his thinking through the years, he never got romantic enough to choose the ultimate option of urging Negroes to migrate *en masse* to Africa. Neither in his greatest anger nor in his deepest despair was he ever driven to the notion that there was an answer for Negroes in recrossing the ocean to resettle in their inhospitable ancestral homeland. When he reverted in 1933 to the idea of Negro self-segregation, it never entered his mind that this self-containment would take place anywhere but right here in the United States. DuBois had the imagination and intelligence to see, long before anyone else, that the meaningful slogan for beleaguered American Negroes as far as Africa was concerned was not *Back-to-Africa*, but *Africa for the Africans*, and this is what he tried to promote with his Pan-African movement. He tried to win both the rulers of the white world and the Negroes of his own world to the self-serving good sense of his idea, and he failed with both.

DuBois, who had long ago chosen the path of retreat into himself, had never felt the need to retreat to Africa. Much as he might like to poetise about the inner peace of tropical languor or time-stopped village life or the dark beauty of the African forest, these remained good to visit, not to stay with, best appreciated from afar. For all his years of passionate Africanising, DuBois himself has never gone back, and plainly never saw any sense in the idea that the masses of American Negroes, much less the fastidiously elegant W. E. B. DuBois himself, should take off to start life all over in the whiteless wilds. The Negro's rightful share of life was in America if he could but win it, and DuBois, be it said, never counselled him otherwise.

DuBois understood that the idea of going Back-to-Africa had appealed over time 'not simply to the inexperienced and the demagogues, but to the prouder and more independent type of Negro . . . tired of begging for justice and recognition'.[1] But from times past on down to the recent 'crazy scheme of Michael Garvey', DuBois had simply found the idea impracticable. Negroes were not equipped to be pioneers, he patiently explained at the height of the Garvey movement, and in any case, Europe's expansion 'made colonies in Africa or elsewhere about the last place where colored folk could seek freedom

[1] *Dusk of Dawn*, p. 195.

and equality'. To would-be migrants moved by Garvey, DuBois made sober answers:

> No person of middle age or beyond should think of migrating . . . Young and energetic people who want to migrate to Africa must remember (that) laborers are not needed in Africa . . . Skilled labor . . . is wanted, but even there the difficulties of remunerative work . . . are very great . . .[1]

Or again:

> Africa belongs to these Africans. They have not the slightest intention of giving it up to foreigners, white or black . . . They resent the attitude that assures that other folk of any color are coming in to take and rule their land. Liberia, for instance . . . is not going to allow American Negroes to assume control and to direct her government. Liberia, in her mind, is for Liberians . . .[2]

No, DuBois wanted to bend Africa otherwise to his designs. He had come strongly to believe, as we have seen, that the rise of the black man in America was linked with the rise of the non-white all over the world. He really thought, in 1919, that the rulers of the white world, war-weary and even frightened, might see the wisdom of beginning to change their ways. He saw that Japan and China were both seeking new voices for themselves in the post-war world. He thought that as far as the black men were concerned, the American Negro, rising steadily in education and attainment despite all obstacles, had to take the lead. He had to speak for the more slowly awakening masses of Africa, just as his hero did in *Dark Princess*, and, indeed, as DuBois himself did when, in Paris in 1919, he organised his first Pan-African Congress. He tried to bring Africans on to the world scene and to make their voices heard, for the first time, in the councils of power.

To American Negroes at home he tried to explain what he was up to:

> This is not a ' separatist ' movement. There is no need to think that those who advocate the opening up of Africa for Africans . . . desire to deport any large number of colored Americans to a foreign and, in some respects, inhospitable land. Once for all, let us realize that we are Americans, that we were brought here with the earliest settlers, and that the very sort of civilization from which we came made the complete adoption of Western modes and customs imperative if we were to survive at all. In brief, there is nothing so indigenous, so completely ' made in America ' as we. It is as absurd to talk of a return to Africa, merely because that was our home 300 years ago, as it would be to expect the members of the Caucasian race to return to the vastnesses of the Caucasus Mountains from which, it is reputed, they sprang.
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> . . . The African movement means to us what the Zionist movement must mean to the Jews, the centralization of race effort and the recognition of a racial fount. To help bear the burden of Africa does not mean any lessening of effort in our own problem at home. Rather it means increased interest. For any ebullition of action and feeling that results in an amelioration of the lot of

[1] *Crisis*, 28:2, p. 57, June 1924.
[2] *Crisis*, 28:3, p. 106, July 1924.

> Africa tends to ameliorate the condition of colored peoples throughout the world. And no man liveth to himself.[1]

This was DuBois in 1919. He got nowhere. His attempt to be sensible about migration was drowned in the din of the Garvey movement and its alarms and diversions. His attempt to give focus to the inner dynamic relating the American Negro to Africa went unnoticed. His words remained without echo until now, more than 40 years later, when they ring in the air all around us.

DuBois had first heard the word 'Pan-African' at a conference he attended in London in 1900. It is odd, yet characteristic of the man, that in his earlier autobiographical work, he makes no mention of this meeting. In a later book, in 1947, he refers to it briefly, remarking that here is where the word 'Pan-African' first appeared, but even then not mentioning his presence there, perhaps because it was a meeting conceived and called not by him but by a 'black West Indian barrister, practising in London', whom he does not even name.[2] In 1911, DuBois addressed a Congress of Races, held also in London under the auspices of the Ethical Culture movement. Whatever sequel that might have had was engulfed by the war. When DuBois suddenly got the chance to go to Europe in 1919, he conceived the notion of trying to dramatise his cause by calling a conference of black men under the slogan of Pan-Africa. As he has recounted in several places[3] he managed to assemble 57 individuals from 15 countries, nine of them African. The Congress appealed to the Versailles Conference to give Africans a chance for free development under international auspices, starting with the African territories taken from Germany. DuBois says that this was the origin of the mandates system. DuBois persisted and managed to assemble a second, larger conference in 1921, a a third at Lisbon in 1925, and a fourth, a token gathering, held in New York in 1927. Through almost all of this time DuBois, to his great embarrassment, saw his Pan-African movement confounded in the world's press (and in many chancelleries) with Marcus Garvey's more flamboyant enterprise. It was, he wrote ruefully, a situation of 'comedy and curious social frustration, but . . . real and in a sense tragic'.[4] In the face of apathy and even resistance among his American associates and a large measure of indifference abroad, he made a last try to call another conference, this time in Tunis, in 1929, but it was aborted and died, and so did the Pan-African movement. It was not revived until 1945, when George Padmore, the ex-Communist West Indian who became the father-counsellor of West African nationalism, and Kwame Nkrumah, one

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[1] *Crisis*, 17:4, p. 166, February 1919.

[2] *The World and Africa*, p. 7. I owe to Rayford Logan a reference to Bishop Alexander Walters' *My Life and Work*, p. 257, in which it is reported that it was at this London conference that DuBois first said that 'the problem of the 20th century is the problem of the colour line'. The conference created an organisation, says Bishop Walters, of which DuBois was named as American vice-president.

[3] *Dusk of Dawn*, pp. 260–2, 274–8, *The World and Africa*, pp. 9–12, 235–45.

[4] *The World and Africa*, p. 277.

of his most promising disciples, convened the fifth Pan-African Conference at Manchester, in England.

When Kwame Nkrumah went on to become the leader of the new Ghana, he had left behind him his earlier crypto-Communist attachments, but had adopted the slogan and the idea of Pan-Africanism for his own. This was largely under Padmore's inspiration. As new African nationalist currents have begun to flow and Africans have begun to take over from Europeans in a swift series of transfers of power in African countries, the image of DuBois has faded from Pan-Africanism. Nkrumah invited DuBois to the Ghana independence celebrations in 1957, but the old man refused to sign an anti-Communist affidavit, could not get a passport, and therefore did not go. In 1958, when Nkrumah convened the first All-African People's Conference at Accra, he again invited the aged DuBois to come and witness the fruition of his early dreams. But this time DuBois was in Moscow, was reported ill, and sent his wife to Accra to represent him. At the conference opening Nkrumah paid tribute both to DuBois and Marcus Garvey, linking their names in a final ironic twist, as pioneers who 'fought for African national and racial equality'.[1] DuBois finally did get back to African soil for the second time in his life to attend the Ghana Republic Day celebrations in July, 1960. He was much honoured as the 'father of Pan-Africanism' but he used the occasion mainly to warn Africans against Anglo-American capitalism and to extol the Soviet system. By now the Communist empire, far more than Africa, had become the nonagenarian DuBois' chosen spiritual home.

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When I was finally granted an hour's audience with Dr. DuBois on a winter day not long before his 92nd birthday, I knew it would be impossible to re-explore much of all this past, that most of my questions would have to go unasked, that I would be lucky enough to catch a glimpse of how he now saw the future, of how the long story was ending. One wanted this glimpse, even knowing that, for a quarter of a century, what DuBois thought had ceased to echo in the thinking of others, that he had passed from behind his famous veil to a new place behind an even more famous curtain.

In his half of a comfortable house in well-to-do Brooklyn Heights, I was shown into DuBois' study, heavy with his life's accumulation of books, including his own on a long and heavy shelf. In spaces on the walls were the parchments of some of his recently-acquired honours from Communist institutions in Eastern Europe. Over the mantel hung a portrait of one of his prized ancestors, a handsome, fair-skinned, patrician-looking man. DuBois walked in slowly, short but of good carriage, fingering the gold chain across his grey-waistcoated middle with a polished Phi Beta Kappa key gleaming upon it. With his small goatee, his high bald crown, his sharp and clear light eyes, his aquiline face, his tone and air of authority, he was the breakfast table autocrat,

[1] St. Clair Drake, 'Pan Africanism, What is It?', *Africa Today*, January–February 1959, p. 7.

only semi-retired, calmly scornful of a world too unintelligent to accept his judgements, the verities of which he was now the venerable guardian. But he was graciously willing to measure them out in quiet and genteel and clean sentences. His politeness, nearly punctilious, gave an odd contrapuntal effect to his words, especially when he was offering up, like verses out of scripture, bits of crude Communist hagiography.

He began by asking me what went on at the Center for International Studies and when I spoke of its interest in world problems, he tapped his fingertips knowingly together and said: 'I suppose this all has to do with investments.' It became clear that what he pictured was a roomful of men with top hats, beaked noses, big bellies, and clawed hands grasping great big money bags, drooling over the outlook for new profits in Asia and Africa. I murmured a small denial and changed the subject, but at first it did not help at all. When we began to discuss the impact of world affairs on Negroes, he said: 'There is really no way for the young Negro to get to know about world affairs. All the news here is suppressed and distorted. He has no way of learning what is going on in the Soviet Union or in China.' Any young Negro travelling abroad, he went on, is 'coached as to what to say. It means that a young man when he goes abroad has to be more or less a traitor to his people. He either keeps his mouth shut abroad or else he lies.' When I opened the matter of his early recollections about Africa, he tapped a fat manuscript on the desk before him. 'I have dealt with this in a new autobiography I have just finished,' he said. 'I will offer it for publication here, but I doubt that it will get published. Of course it *will* be published, in Russia, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.' I looked over his head at the shelf of his own works, all issued here over the many years, and I thought that I might ask him if in all the Soviet Union or China he could find such a shelf of books, or even a single volume, written by anyone who was even in small part the critic, opponent, and rebel against the society that DuBois had been all his life in America. But I pressed on to other things, and although DuBois has never been a man lightly turned away from his obsessions, we did cover some small patches of new and higher ground, enough to show me that even in this latest and perhaps last of his outlooks, an impressive intelligence survives.

It quickly became clear that DuBois, who had despaired 25 years ago of winning through to Negro integration in American life, was now concerned with the effects of integration, seeing its success as already assured. He had leapfrogged ahead to new problems: 'The Negro child gets into a school which is integrated, and the chances are nine out of ten that he will have an unsympathetic teacher who won't know or care anything about the history of Negroes. How will he ever get to know anything about it?' He was worried much more by the fear that with growing economic opportunity and well-being, Negroes were getting to be just like whites: 'Most of the Negroes who went to Ghana for the independence celebration, or have gone there since, have been interested in business and investments, in what money they could make . . . In Ghana there was a flood of Americans, Negro and white,

who just wanted to make money. It was the same when Nkrumah was here.' And the principal difference from the past was that 'the Negro now assumes he has the same chance' as the white man to profit. ' This is the sickness of the whole American civilisation, money! The insidious thing is that Negroes are taking white Americans as their pattern, to make a life out of buying and selling and become rich, spending for show.'

What were the alternatives for the Negro, I asked. Alienation? Migration? Integration?

DuBois ruled out alienation, and he credited this to the Communist world. 'The thing that will stop any new alienation of Negroes from whites will be the attitudes of the Soviet Union and China. The Negro gets more consideration in the Soviet Union and China than he ever got in England or France or elsewhere. You can't have another movement like Garvey's (i.e., against whites) because you would have to include as whites the 200,000,000 Russians, Czechs, and so on. And now countries that can't get capital on satisfactory terms from the West can turn to the Soviet Union, and eventually to China, and get it at 2 per cent.'

Migration? He thought not. 'Of course it is true that for a long time many Negroes had come to think that there was no hope of winning equality in the United States and that it was best to get out. But they were disappointed in Liberia and disappointed in Garvey and had to be content with the emphasis, sometimes the over-emphasis, on Africa and race pride in books like Carter Woodson's . . . But there will be no reproduction of any urge to migrate. Negroes now have the chance to go into business, opportunities are opening up. You now have Negro millionaires!'

Integration, then?

'The real question is: after there is no more discrimination based on race and colour, what do you do, where do you go? I have somewhere drawn the analogy of being on a train, and having a fight with my fellow passengers over my treatment on that train while I should be thinking: where is this train going? We have fought down discrimination. There has been tremendous improvement. Negroes are becoming Americans. But then what are Americans to become?'

Well, what is the prospect, then, and what about Africa?

'I don't know,' replied DuBois. 'The Negro is not working it out. He doesn't really see the problem yet. In the next 10 to 20 years there will be a change of thought regarding the relationship of the American Negro to Africa and to the world. We used to think that because they were educated, and had some chance, American Negroes would lead Africans to progress. But the chances are now that Africa will lead American Negroes. But into what kind of world? And what kind of world will there be to be led into? I do not know where the American people will decide to move, but I am sure that the organisation of Africa will have a decisive effort on what American Negroes will do and think about the future. I don't think they will leave the United

States. Negroes will be more and more integrated. There will be more more and more intermarriage . . . But this will be a longtime development of a hundred years or more. The question even then is: what culture of Africa and what culture of the American Negro will succeed in surviving? What in general of the culture of the world? The question really is what will all human society be like? We prefer varieties. What will the varieties be? I don't think it is really important for the future of mankind what colour skin men will have or what their racial characteristics will be. I don't think the issue of race is central, that the colour of skin is the important thing. The Negro has been trying to unmake the situation in which this was important and he should not be drawn back toward it. I don't really care what the racial identity of people will be in the twenty-third century. I don't think the future of 'Negritude' is important. What will be important is what people will be thinking and doing by then.'

This was DuBois, at 92 straining his eyes harder than ever from his lonely hilltop, and now, as at the beginning, glimpsing dreams and ideas far, far away, across a foreground pitted and barred by the grotesque shapes and distortions of the nearby reality. For him these were the enshrouding distortions of racism and to fight debasement he made himself into a racist, genteel, intelligent and literate, but still a racist. When he came, in his late age, to abandon the racist view—if that, indeed is what he has really done—it has been to embrace as more humane the greater inhumanities of Communist totalitarianism. All his life DuBois scornfully rejected the preachers of pie-in-the-sky, believing that in heaven a man was nothing and had to win his freedom on earth, only in his last years to surrender to those for whom a man's freedom is nothing, neither in heaven nor, most of all, on earth.

DuBois did not settle the Negro score. It is being settled by the great glacial pressures that do finally move human society. But he did make himself part of those pressures and the 'settlement', as it comes, resembles much of what he wanted for black men in America and in Africa, and from this he must gather what satisfaction he can. But DuBois did not settle his own score either. He wanted recognition, acceptance, eminence, a life among peers. When he was denied, he cut himself off. Today he still stands apart from all, except the Communists who cynically do him honour for his use as a symbol now, especially abroad, and some older Negroes who remember with respect what he did for them in a distant past. It would be impossible to know whether all of DuBois' unsatisfied urges and dreams for himself are gratified and realised in the recognition extended to him by the Communist world. He may insist that he sees Communist world power as man's last best hope; it is hard not to imagine that he also sees in it history's means for finally settling the white world's accounts with him, and with his fellow non-whites. Either way, he helps explain the nature of his failure, and leaves one only to guess what a great man he might have become had he been able to set himself resolutely all his life against *all* forms of tyranny over the minds of men.

THE HEIGHTENING OF RACIAL TENSION*

LEO KUPER

The analysis of techniques for heightening racial tensions may suggest a fresh approach to some of the problems connected with the reduction of racial tensions, since they are based on the same theoretical propositions. It is with this hope that I am using material derived from South African experience to suggest how racial tensions may be heightened. I do not propose to raise the question whether the heightening of racial tension in South Africa is the result of deliberate policy. Nor can I discuss in this paper the evidence for the contention that there has been an increase in racial tension, though I will briefly mention the following:—increase in passive resistance by non-whites, both civil disobedience and boycotts; mass treason trials of non-white leaders; reactions to racial segregation under the Group Areas Act; resistance of African women to extension of passes, and demonstrations against white authority; removal of settled African populations; cleavage between the English and Afrikaans-speaking churches on the policy of apartheid, and to a large extent between English and Afrikaans-speaking on the republican referendum; and finally suspension of the rule of law under emergency regulations.

My approach is that a sociologist, working out techniques to heighten racial tension, would proceed in much the same way as the South African Government. And in analysing these techniques, I shall deal primarily with Government policy in its effects on the dominant white population and leave out of account many agencies which provide sustenance, by direct teaching and example, for racial prejudice and discrimination—the home, where racial prejudice may be moulded into the personality; the schools, through indoctrination by teachers; and the churches, providing holy writ for racial rites.

RACE CONSCIOUSNESS

Both racial prejudice and discrimination involve the invidious classification of an individual in racial terms, regardless of his actual qualities. A major objective, in reducing racial tension, is therefore to attack the roots of prejudice and discrimination by moulding attitude and behaviour away from racial categories toward the recognition of the individual personality, and of individual rights and obligations. Conversely in heightening racial tension, the technique is to heighten *race consciousness*, by so weaving racial classification

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into the perception of the individual, that the basic definition of the widest possible range of situations is in racial terms. The *first* requirement is thus an unambiguous system of racial classification.

In South Africa, this was introduced under the Population Registration Act No. 30 of 1950, by which the Government classifies each person according to racial category. The impossibility of carrying out the initial classification either scientifically or justly is irrelevant: the objective is the final certainty of an official classification to replace the ambiguous criteria of appearance, ancestry and social acceptance. Even then inter-racial sex relations might dissolve the dominant group, so that sex relations must be controlled at the same time that racial registration is introduced. The first two major racial laws passed by the present South African Government deal with the control of sex—the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949, and the Immorality Amendment Act, No. 21 of 1950: the Population Registration Act is the third in the series.

The *second* requirement is to extend the range of situations in which racial classification is mandatory as a guide to conduct. The following situations are based on racial criteria in terms of the major racial laws introduced (or amended) by the South African Government over the last ten years: marriage; 'illicit carnal intercourse'; proximity between neighbours and traders; inclusion on a common electoral roll; school education for Africans; industrial conciliation machinery for Africans; reservation of occupations; control of contact in trade; control of contact with Africans in churches, schools, hospitals, clubs, places of entertainment, public assemblies; occupation of premises for a substantial period of time, and finally university education. In consequence the racial concept becomes increasingly weighted with social and cultural connotations. The South African laws mentioned above deliberately enact a faulty and inflexible generalisation, associating the physical criterion of race with unfitness as a marriage partner, prostitute, neighbour, fellow worshipper, fellow student and so on.

All these laws and policies might be less effective if they were not supported by a system of punishments and rewards, and this is a *third* requirement in heightening race consciousness. The control of relations is enforced by penal sanctions. Marriage, sex relations, living in a home, trading, working, studying, worshipping in a Christian church, healing, welfare work, going to a cinema, eating, and attending a meeting are not in themselves criminal offences in South Africa. But they may become so if they involve forbidden race relations. The primacy of the racial criterion is thus emphasised in the daily indispensable routine of living, under the threat of punishment as a criminal. On the positive side, rewards provide additional incentives. Racial segregation in South Africa is highly discriminatory, and we can assume that, with a few exceptions, discrimination is immediately rewarding to those who impose it. Moreover, such recent laws as the Group Areas Act, providing for residential and commercial segregation, offer new and handsome dividends in the racial partitioning of South Africa,

and the reservation of occupations provides a systematic basis for favoured treatment in employment.

Heightened race consciousness is instilled through the mechanism of activity based on racial classification. More and more persons are involved in an extended range of rewarding or threatening racial situations. Most of the white population are committed in one way or another—as participants in plans for the racial redistribution of property and opportunities for unearned wealth under the Group Areas Act, as employers of non-white labour, domestic and other, and so on, in many of the different contexts described above. New occupational opportunities are opened in state and local administration, and rewards of office stimulate conscientious devotion to racialism. Outside of administration, organisations providing services on an inter-racial basis are obliged to re-examine, and perhaps modify, their policies in the light of the new racial laws, and even those who oppose these laws become more racially conscious under conditions where inter-racial contact savours of deliberate defiance.

Non-whites are equally affected with whites. Administration and legislation involve not only broad categories of non-whites but their sub-divisions—Coloured, Malay, Chinese, Indian, and, in the case of Africans, linguistic and tribal sub-divisions. Increasingly, the linguistic or ethnic group is the unit of administration for Africans, as for example in the revival of tribal authority in the rural areas, and settlement by segregated linguistic groups in the towns and in the new universities. Reward and punishment reinforce the system. Penal sanctions inevitably fall more heavily on the non-whites, and their punishment is augmented indirectly by the redistribution of resources, as in the Group Areas Act. But there are rewards too, largely fictitious as in the promise of separate development along their own lines for the African, but real also, as in the opening of occupational opportunities in racial administration, such as tribal councils and school boards, and in the economic expansion of the country.

Inevitably political activity follows the lines of racial cleavage, expressed in legislation and propagated by it. The Government virtually represents the Afrikaner people and the interests of Afrikaner domination, and derives its dynamic force from racial conflict; the official opposition represents English-speaking white people and a minority of Afrikaners, and the interests of the English-speaking in an equal share in white domination; the non-white political groups are largely confined to extra-parliamentary activities directed against white domination. Political activity, pressure toward conservatism or toward revolution, is essentially racial, and serves to heighten racial consciousness.

In the circumstances, there is little likelihood that the people of South Africa will lose their 'sense of colour', as members of the Government sometimes phrase it. And even the countermeasures for reducing race consciousness, by emphasising what the races have in common, are rendered less effective. Common loyalty to South Africa is explicitly

denied by a philosophy which affirms the unique destiny of racial groups in their separate areas. Humanitarian democratic ideals are already largely redefined among the Europeans of South Africa in such a way as to accommodate racialism, and many of the present controls—such as the control over education, the suppression of mission schools, the threat to inter-racial worship—are designed to insulate these ideals. None the less, these counters to racial consciousness in the form of national loyalty, humanitarian ideals and religious brotherhood remain an intense irritant, provoking strong reaction.

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Heightened racial consciousness may not necessarily imply an increase in racial prejudice, but it is channelled in this antagonistic direction by unfavourable stereotypes of other races, and by policies and ideologies which create or intensify competition between the races.

The many racial laws in South Africa shape an image of other races which is compounded of unfavourable qualities—unfitness as a marriage partner, neighbour, club member and so on, discussed above. Legislative policy and national administration make racial competition for the resources of the country public and patent as under the Group Areas Act, where the redistribution of property in favour of the white population proceeds with great deliberation by way of public hearings and semi-judicial procedures. The racial ideology of the dominant group, in one of its most general formulations, rests on the basic incompatibility of the races, and the inevitability of conflict between them when in contact. Races must dominate or be dominated; or to express the theory in less general terms, the non-whites will use their numbers to dominate the whites if given the opportunity. Therefore the survival of the white man and his way of life depends on white paramountcy, which is to say, discrimination against non-whites in all material respects.

These laws, policies and ideologies presumably encourage conflict in racial contact, since there is an ideological expectation of conflict. Race consciousness is canalised in a sharply antagonistic form by the concept, and the reality, of races in competition for power and wealth, while discrimination is invited, since self-preservation is assumed to depend on withholding from the subordinate races, as far as possible, any opportunities which might contribute to their power as competing groups.

Discrimination itself provides a major weapon in the heightening of racial prejudice and racial tension. Provisionally, we may regard discrimination as the overt public expression of the individual's private prejudice. Prejudice tends to express itself in discrimination, and discrimination tends to foster prejudice. Since prejudice and discrimination act on each other, techniques for heightening racial tension may concentrate on either prejudice or discrimination. Discrimination, in many of its forms, is more amenable to control by governments, and

the indirect approach to prejudice through control of discrimination may therefore prove specially attractive.

In reducing racial tension, one of the techniques is to bring members of different races together in non-discriminatory situations, preferably on an intimate basis and pursuing common objectives—as in work-camps, seminars, inter-racial housing. Or to phrase the matter differently, the approach is to introduce the experience of primary contact, that is to say, intimate contact, between members of different races on a basis of equality. Here, the relationship between prejudice and discrimination is being used to reduce racial prejudice. Discrimination is the focus of the attack, and indirectly, through discrimination, racial prejudice. The theory is that the participants, finding themselves in a situation where their relationship is not defined in racially invidious terms, begin to perceive each other as individuals, and in this way the basis of racial prejudice, categorisation, is undermined.

Conversely, prejudice may be stimulated through discrimination, by so shaping the social environment that members of different races meet consistently in a discriminatory context. Primary contacts must be eliminated as far as possible, excluding however the master and servant relationship, while secondary contacts, that is to say, formal, remote contacts, are confined to discriminatory situations, or are highly impersonal and fleeting. This is the pattern of the South African Government's main racial laws, listed above in rough chronological order. The general direction of control and prohibition is from primary to secondary contacts (from marrige and sex relations to inter-racial worship and university education), or taking a different point of view, from the physical to the spiritual and intellectual. As a result of systematic discrimination, the white man will find himself consistently in a position of superiority, and this routine experience may be expected to reinforce sentiments of superiority expressed in the demand for its maintenance and perhaps its enhancement by further discrimination. Moreover, a realistic basis for these sentiments of superiority is ensured by discrimination itself, which severely limits the opportunities for development of members of the subordinate races. Systematic discrimination is the vehicle for heightening racial prejudice, and hence racial tension.

A marked feature of the South African Government's policy is the intolerance of exceptions to the general rule of racial discrimination. For example, the number of white persons employed by Indian merchants is negligible; racial segregation prevails to a large extent in university education; worship in the English-speaking churches is substantially segregated. Yet the Government insists on the power to control and eliminate these exceptions, and even in the new universities for Africans, where their interests might be expected to dominate, the statute provides for a non-white Advisory Council and Senate, and a white controlling Council and Senate (a situation ultimately to be reversed, so it is said). Only diplomatic representatives and their families will enjoy immunity from the general rule of racial inequality, a reluctant concession to international relations.

This intolerance may be an expression of racial prejudice, with its inflexible generalisations, in an equally inflexible legislative policy. Or it may arise from the fear that the white man's sentiments of superiority, and non-white acceptance of that superiority, may be undermined, since even a single exception challenges racial generalisation (though there are mechanisms by which racial prejudice is insulated against exceptions, and exceptions, and knowledge of exceptions, cannot be eliminated in the case of races whose habitat extends beyond the area of national sovereignty). Perhaps the explanation is less complex: a growing volume of exceptions was changing the traditional structure of white domination, and the Government hoped to eliminate evolutionary change by eliminating exceptions, and thus establish a more enduring domination.

We have assumed a general correspondence between racial prejudice and discrimination, but the relationship is more complex. There may be prejudice without discrimination, either because the individual's position in the society denies him the opportunity to discriminate, or because of self-restraint, or the restraints of a society which prohibits discrimination, as in England. And conversely, there may be discrimination without prejudice, as is the position with the small minority of unprejudiced white persons in South Africa, who are compelled to discriminate equally with the overwhelming majority of prejudiced persons. I am thinking here, for example, of the white university lecturer, who finds himself obliged to discriminate against his non-white students when he teaches them under conditions of segregated and inferior facilities; or of the white person who takes part in a discriminatory situation, whenever he goes to a theatre or concert, or votes in an election.

The effects on the unprejudiced white person of his own acts of discrimination require investigation. They will vary with the situation and the personalities of the individuals involved. In the absence of research findings, I would like to suggest over-conformity as an unexpected consequence arising in certain cases—an over-conformity which may express itself either as an extreme racial prejudice, or as discrimination going beyond the requirements of law and custom.

As an example of over-conforming in racial prejudice, we may take the case of immigrants from such racially tolerant countries as England, who sometimes change rapidly from an initial rejection of discrimination to a positive expression of extreme racial prejudice. There may be a selective factor involved, the attraction to South Africa by the opportunity for racial domination, so that some of these settlers arrive with a predisposition to extreme racial prejudice which is then nurtured by the favourable environment. The same consequence may however result for immigrants who are relatively free from racial prejudice, but lack the experience of race contact and perhaps deep inner conviction. Just as they conformed with the norms of English society, so they now conform with those of South Africa. Finding themselves consistently in situations of systematic discrimination, they experience an unexpected

and intense pleasure in the novel sensation of superiority and domination over their fellow human beings, which needs justification. They are thus given an incentive to acquire the appropriate supporting attitudes, and parvenu-like, exulting in their new-found wealth, they exaggerate these attitudes—a process assisted by ignorance of other races, the failure to allow for cultural differences and the results of discrimination, and consequent unrealistic expectations of behaviour.

The second type of over-conformity—in discriminatory practices—sometimes appears among unprejudiced South African-born white persons. And the opportunity for observing it occurs during crises, as, for example, when the Minister of Native Affairs assumed power to control contact with Africans in a variety of situations affecting inter-racial organisations. The law governed only contact with Africans, and in many instances required further action, such as a proclamation or refusal of an application, before the prohibition became effective. Yet the law was interpreted by many workers providing services on an inter-racial basis, as an immediate prohibition affecting contact with any racial group, and it was difficult to disturb this inner conviction or deep feeling by careful exposition of the law.

Interpretation of this behaviour is complicated by the fact that the obligation to discriminate provides the opportunity for the prejudiced person to masquerade as unprejudiced, since behaviour is a poor guide to attitude in circumstances where uniformity is compelled. The prejudiced person may thus enjoy the best of two worlds—the fruits of discrimination and conformity, and at the same time the reputation and self-satisfaction of subscribing to the highest ideals. But there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of some of these workers, and I suggest that the explanation of their over-conformity may be found in the divorce between attitude and behaviour. Their attitudes are no longer a safe guide to behaviour, because of the new restrictions introduced by the laws. Lacking the inner guide to behaviour, reference can only be to the demands of the Government. Conduct is determined not by the individual's own ideals, but by the desire to satisfy the Government.

The circumstances moreover provoke anxiety, since the normal routine is threatened by penal sanctions. In consequence, there is a tendency to restore security by over-conformity, that is to say, an extreme conformity with the ultimate intention of the Government, namely the prohibition of inter-racial contact on a basis of equality, rather than conformity with the interim, precisely defined, requirements of the law. There can thus be no possible ground for complaint. Indeed, the discomfort of the anxiety, and of the repudiation of one's own ideals, may implant prejudice as a more secure state of mind.

The introduction of penal sanctions to compel discrimination probably has the general effect of instilling prejudice. There is certainly truth in the proposition that we disapprove of an act because it is a crime, rather than that it is a crime because we disapprove of it. Hence, the legislative creation of new crimes extends the range of acts of which

we tend to disapprove. Since the new crimes relate to inter-racial contact, pressure is exerted to disapprove of inter-racial contact, thus laying a basis for racial prejudice even among the tolerant.

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Within South Africa, only a radical change in the whole structure of discrimination will be effective in reducing race tensions. The reason for this is that racial consciousness and racial prejudice feed on discrimination, and that in almost every aspect of South African life there are institutional supports and stimuli for racial discrimination and prejudice.

Radical change in the pattern of discrimination will be achieved by internal resistance movements which will inevitably take the predominant form of racial conflict, and by external pressures, for instance from the United Nations forum and international boycotts. The evolutionary working out of the South African Government's programme is also likely to be a factor. There are limits to the introduction of social change, and exceeding these sets up tensions which exert counter-pressure. The many laws passed by the Government to eliminate race relations on a basis of equality are evidence of an equilibrium which comprises exceptions to the general rule of racial inequality, reflecting the changing structure of the South African economy through industrial developments, and the influence of a changing world and of democratic ideologies. The sharp disturbance of this equilibrium by the Government will stimulate counter-pressure to establish more harmonious race relations—and there are indications of it, for example, in calls for inter-racial consultation, and reactions by industrialists over labour relations.

Finally, the role of moral values should not be ignored. Paradoxically enough, their significance is shown by the deceit and hypocrisy of the Government's policy as exemplified in the programme for Bantustans. A crude form of colonial exploitation is dressed up in the pseudo-morality of a fantasy of separate development, and much discussion is focussed on the morality of the fantasy rather than on the reality of the exploitation. In general, I would regard the individual conscience on human rights in a society as reflecting the distribution of power within that society, and I interpret the so-called stirrings of conscience among the intellectual and spiritual supporters of the doctrine of apartheid as partly the stirrings of the realisation that there has already been a change in the distribution of power between white and non-white, due to the growing political organisation of the non-white peoples.

The conventional techniques for reducing racial tension are, in themselves, not adequate in the South African context. Taken however in conjunction with the increasing effectiveness of external and internal pressures, they can serve a valuable function in an auxiliary role, more particularly in promoting moral evaluation and in mitigating the racialism attendant on the conflict. Pressure might be exerted against thinking and acting in racial categories, by promoting intimate contact between

members of different races, and by emphasis on what the races have in common—shared religious, human and economic interests and values. It is a slow process when weighed against the increasing militant urgency of non-white political demands, stimulated by major changes in Africa, outside the Union.

I have assumed the possibility of evolutionary change, though rapid. There are other indications however. Africans have grown desperate under continuous suffering. An extreme and violent form of African nationalism is developing. Revolution is freely expressed, not only in the attitudes of Africans, but also in those of the whites, with their incessant anxiety, and interminable discussions of the impending conflict. Revolution becomes a possibility when Africans can hope for arms and other help from independent African States. Under these circumstances it is increasingly difficult for white and non-white to work together. The scope for inter-racial contact has sharply contracted. The techniques for heightening racial tension have been so effectively applied over the last decade as to bring South Africa to the threshold of revolution.

The local problem of practical action within South Africa is, however, relatively insignificant when compared with the broad problem of deriving from South African experience suggestions of general applicability for the reduction of racial tensions. Unfortunately, social scientists have not availed themselves of the research opportunities and the analysis of this paper permits only two tentative suggestions. The first relates to the role of exceptions in racially tolerant societies, such as England, where there is legally sanctioned racial equality in public life and a general philosophy condemning discrimination. The number of exceptions to this general principle in England is by no means small, but their significance is not to be measured numerically, since even the occasional exception undermines the general principle. And we may enquire whether English tolerance of discrimination in more private spheres of life, such as employment or the leasing of rooms by landladies, and sometimes too in more public spheres, such as service by inn-keepers, has not proved a stimulus to racial prejudice. The second suggestion relates to the way in which public morality is shaped by penal sanctions, and the possibility of reinforcing racial tolerance by the sharp punishment of breaches. The application of this principle is certainly suggested where there is a general supporting public opinion: in other circumstances, it may create a sharp conflict, though perhaps temporary, and in extreme cases, a challenge to law and order.

'MULTI-RACIALISM' AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TANGANYIKA

CRANFORD PRATT*

For eight years, from 1949 until 1957, the Government of Tanganyika promoted political and constitutional policies that were known collectively as a policy of 'multi-racialism'. The concept is vague and its meaning shifted significantly during these years. But underlying the changing details were the continuing convictions that the European and Asian minorities[1] were of crucial economic importance and that they would be content to remain in Tanganyika only if they could be sure of personal security, political stability, the continuation of Western standards in the administration and public services and the opportunity to contribute significantly to the formation of government policies. The Government sought to avoid political reforms that would soon lead to African political control. It sought instead constitutional arrangements which would permit representatives of each racial community to play an important part in the legislature and would not threaten the high standards of the administration throughout the country.

Before this 'multi-racialism' Tanganyika had in effect no national constitutional policy. Indirect Rule had been the guiding philosophy of the British. Before 1945 native policy had been dominated by a concern to maintain African tribal institutions and make them the local agents of a modern and just rule. The entire emphasis was on the tribal character of African life. African participation in the Legislative Council and the senior ranks of the civil service was regarded as inappropriate. More than that, it was thought illiberal, as forcing the African into institutions that were foreign to his society and its values. No thought was yet given to the supra-tribal institutions that would eventually be needed if Tanganyika was to manage its own affairs.

Immediately after the second war several developments led to a change in native administration policy. Many chiefs were proving incompetent to deal with such new functions of local rule as agricultural and veterinary development. If these new services were to prosper abler and more educated men would have to be brought into many native authorities. During the war chiefs had been less closely supervised and many had developed unpopular autocratic tendencies. Finally the Tanganyika Government shared the desire of most colonial governments at the time to provide some local outlet, positive but harmless, for returning troops and for the politically restless few who had begun

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[1] There were 20,598 Europeans, 71,760 Asians and 8,665,336 Africans in Tanganyika in 1959 (Tanganyika Press Release 2 April 1959).

to assert themselves in the more advanced tribes. For these varied reasons gradually and cautiously the Administration began to establish local councils either as advisory councils to the native authorities or, in some cases, as native authority itself.

This development was in one sense an anticipation of the famous despatch of the Secretary of State of 25 February 1947, in which he urged the rapid development of democratic local government in the British territories of Africa. But he was concerned with different, and in part contradictory, objectives to those being sought by the Tanganyika reforms. The Colonial Office foresaw the likelihood of a rapid advance to self-government in most colonial territories. Democratic local government was suggested as a training-ground for this independence and as a political institution that would be of great value after independence.[1] The Government of Tanganyika, by contrast, deprecated any suggestion that the rate of political development was likely to be rapid. It was in no sense planning for independence. The reforms in Tanganyika were introduced to increase administrative efficiency and political control. They were improvements to a system of colonial rule, not a preparation for its dismantling.[2]

Another post-war development was the inclusion of African unofficial members in the Legislative Council in 1945. This move, which paralleled similar appointments in Kenya and Uganda, presaged a crucial controversy over the ratio that ought to exist between the representatives of each race.[3] But the controversy did not begin immediately. The first African appointments were few and were welcomed by the other communities. They were in effect an acknowledgment that Tanganyika was not immune to the political developments occurring throughout the rest of British Africa. They were not a first stage of any preconceived long-range government plan of political advance. It was not until further constitutional reforms were contemplated that the racial balance on the representative side of the legislature became a major political issue.

In the immediate post-war years official policy was still based on the earlier view that British control must continue until the Africans could 'take their full part with the other sections of the community in the political and economic life of the territory'.[4] Statements such as this occur frequently in policy announcements in both Tanganyika and Britain.

There is an element of caution in the statements. They do not commit either Government to a view on how political power should

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[1] For a fuller discussion of this despatch see D. A. Low and R. C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule* 1900–1955 (London, 1960), Chap. 11.

[2] Nothing illustrates this more than the hostility and suspicion with which the Tanganyika Government, along with most others, greeted the Secretary of State's despatch of February 1947.

[3] At first, in 1945, only 2 Africans were included. By 1948 there were 7 European, 4 African and 3 Asian unofficial members in the Council. They were all appointed by the Governor.

[4] James Griffiths, when Secretary of State, 13 December 1950. Quoted by the Governor of Tanganyika in May 1957 (*East Africa and Rhodesia*, 9 May 1957, p. 1205).

be divided between the races once the African community has come of age. They do not say that Africans will then be granted a clear majority. But what they do clearly say, as did the earlier pre-war policy statements, is that self-government or responsible government will not be given while the legislature is controlled by the European minority.

To whom then was Britain willing to transfer power? The answer to this is less clear. Once Africans were brought into the Legislative Council this question could not long be avoided. Was there to be an elected African majority first on the unofficial side and then finally in the Legislative Council as a whole? Was Britain willing to declare that she would eventually transfer power to an African Government? The answer is, simply, no. The old pronouncements that there could be no self-government until Africans could protect themselves were no longer adequate, but they were not followed by a clear acceptance of eventual African rule. Just as rule by a white minority had earlier been opposed, so too in the period from 1949–1957 was rule by an African majority. The constitutional policies of Britain in Tanganyika were not the same as they had been in Ghana. In Tanganyika the interim objective was a constitution which would give each community adequate representation, promote racial co-operation and leave Britain with an official majority in the legislature. The ultimate objective was a non-racial society, in which racial considerations no longer dominated political choice or shaped political relationships. When that objective was reached, but not before, Britain would concede independence.

In December 1949 the Governor, Sir Edward Twining, appointed a Constitutional Committee '. . . to make recommendations for the future constitutional development in the Territory'.[1] He had prepared his own recommendations and submitted them to the Committee members as a confidential memorandum.[2] He suggested the establishment of provincial councils in Tanganyika to act as electoral colleges to elect an equal number of Africans and non-Africans to the Legislative Council. This 1 : 1 ratio of African to non-African had been approved by the Colonial Office before the memorandum was circulated. In the event, however, the Constitutional Committee recommended a ratio of 1 : 1 : 1 between African, Asian and European unofficial members and this was accepted by the Governor and the Secretary of State.[3] For at least four years this parity of representation was the central proposition of Tanganyika's policy of 'multi-racialism'.

There were, I think, four aspects to this parity formula as it was first accepted by the Constitutional Committee and the Tanganyika Government. (1) It was an unquestioned premise that the protection of

[1] Foreword to the *Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development*, 1951 (Dar es Salaam, 1951).

[2] Substantial summaries of this memorandum found their way into the *East African Standard* and the *Kenya Weekly News* early in 1950. A copy is now on the open shelves of the Secretariat Library in Dar es Salaam (reference T 1146/6).

[3] Despatches of 22 March 1951 and 25 July 1951 (Report of Committee, pp. 31–40).

minority rights required greatly enhanced political representation for the minorities. (2) The inter-racial co-operation, the partnership, that was to be promoted was between racial communities, not between individuals of different races. (3) Because of the disparity of numbers and because of the separate identity of each community any elections would have to be on separate communal rolls.[1] (4) Although parity was never presented as a permanent feature of Tanganyika's constitution, it was to last for a long time. It was never linked with a promise of an eventual African majority—rather, the reverse. The emphasis was on the need for a constitution to meet Tanganyika's special needs. The future constitution was to be decided eventually by the representatives of the three races.

One major change in Tanganyika's 'multi-racial' policy was made in 1955, when the Government agreed that common roll elections should be held in the near future[2]. Professor MacKenzie had accepted the force of the well-known arguments that common roll elections encourage racial co-operation and communal rolls perpetuate racial politics. To these he added the further point that with separate communal rolls a stable majority party would be unlikely to develop and this would make difficult any further progress to responsible government. Yet, if a common roll were not to give predominant control to one race, there would have to be an approximate balancing of racial proportions on the roll. This could not be achieved in most rural constituencies in Tanganyika, no matter how high the voting qualifications, because the African majority is so overwhelming. MacKenzie therefore concluded that common roll elections could only be held in two urban constituencies under the proposed constitution.

In 1957 the Governor proposed that common roll elections should be held in several urban constituencies. Each voter would vote for three members, one of each race. The qualifications for the vote were comparatively high, the crucial one being an annual income of £150 a year or education to the end of Standard VIII. Parity and a qualified franchise were thus married together for the urban constituencies. In the remaining constituencies members would continue to be nominated and there was still no indication of how the Government intended to introduce elections.

The problem of interpreting Britain's policy in Tanganyika at this time is not to explain her concern for the rights of the minorities. This was legitimate and expected. The problem is to explain why it was felt that minorities of 20,000 and 70,000, living amidst 8,500,000 Africans, had the right to such vastly disproportionate political representation. There is, I think, no simple answer, but the main factor is surely not ethical but political. The Government of Tanganyika was operating in a political situation, searching for a formula to balance the pressures that each racial group brought to bear upon it. The

[1] This was Twining's view in 1951 (ibid. p. 36).

[2] *Report of the Special Commissioner appointed to examine matters arising out of the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development* (Dar es Salaam, 1953).

1 : 1 : 1 ratio seemed to represent this equilibrium in 1951.[1] Each group accepted it; none was enthusiastically in favour of it.[2]

Political considerations wider than those internal to Tanganyika were also influential. The pressure, for example, to drop the proposed 1 : 1 ratio of Africans to non-Africans came initially and most strongly from neighbouring Kenya, where of course the European community is larger and much more influential.[3] Moreover the Colonial Office tended to view East and Central Africa together as a multi-racial area and was anxious that British policy in any one territory should not wander too far from the pattern which it was currently hoping to promote more widely throughout the area.[4] With partnership so strong a theme in Central Africa there was an understandable reluctance to make major concessions to African nationalism in Tanganyika or Uganda.

While these external considerations may be deprecated, the adaptation of the electoral system to match the internal distribution of political power need not be dismissed as a cynical piece of Machiavellianism. It can as well be presented as a necessary exercise of political wisdom.[5] If, in a plural society where the racial groups distrust each other, there is a gross lack of balance between the representation each group receives and the power which each has outside the legislature, the hostility of the 'under-represented' may threaten the whole system.

What went wrong in Tanganyika was that the balance of power to which the principle of parity corresponded was artificial and temporary. It did not reflect the lasting power relationship between the three communities. It was artificial because it corresponded to a balance of political forces *as they operated upon a colonial government*, and British colonial governments were more sensitive to European pressure. It was temporary because African opinion was inarticulate and unorganised, and there was little African pressure to counterbalance that of the European community.

The Tanganyika Government itself might have provided the counterbalance, as it had done in the inter-war years. But it was one thing for government officers to oppose European pressure in order to

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[1] That such considerations were dominant is substantiated by an examination of the racial composition of the other legislatures in East and Central Africa. In each case the ratios reflect the relative political power of the European community. There were more European than non-European unofficials in the legislatures of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and preponderant European control in the new Federal legislature was soon to be granted. The ratio of European to Asian to African unofficial members in Kenya was 2:1:1 and in Uganda it was 1:1:2.

[2] African evidence to the Constitutional Committee had favoured either an African majority amongst the unofficial members or at least a ratio of 1:1 between Africans, and non-Africans. European groups wished to continue the existing ratio. Asians were anxious to receive equal representation with the Europeans.

[3] I understand from Dr. Margaret Bates that the 1:1 ratio had been discussed without incident in 1949 with the European groups within Tanganyika and that it was not until the news leaked to a critical Kenya press that there was any public outcry against it.

[4] This factor may help to explain the rapid abandonment of support for communal elections in Tanganyika in favour of a common roll system based on a qualitative franchise.

[5] See for example W. J. M. MacKenzie, 'Representation in Plural Societies', *Political Studies*, February 1954, Vol. 11, No. 1.

maintain effective colonial rules; it was quite another to resist this pressure in order to promote an early handover to a predominantly African government. By 1950 many Tanganyika officials had come to support the right of the minorities to representation equal to that of the vast African majority.[1]

Government policy in Tanganyika after the war gave greater emphasis than before to economic development. With this came an increased awareness of the possible contribution of non-Africans. In land policy for example the earlier emphasis had always been on the preservation of areas equal to the present and future needs of the African population. Although there was never any suggestion of extensive alienation,[2] interest shifted after 1945 to problems of land usage rather than land reservation and with that official interest in non-African farming quickened. 'It is now accepted', said one Secretariat memorandum, 'that the health, wealth and general interest of the African are not best served by leaving him in isolation surrounded by great tracts of undeveloped land that may be needed for his anticipated progeny. On the contrary the development of the territory is now believed to depend on the combined efforts of all communities.'[3]

The heritage of paternalism gave added strength to the official support for parity. The tradition of British administration in Tanganyika was one of selfless service and this continued to be its dominant mood. But paternalism does not easily accept or understand the discontents of a nationalist movement which deprecates its motives, is offended by its assumed superiority and appears to threaten much that it has laboriously developed. In Tanganyika, as in most of British tropical Africa, colonial administrators were hostile towards African nationalism. They had become disillusioned by what they regarded as the lack of integrity and honesty amongst Africans.[4] Many became more concerned with the dangers of moving too fast than with the need to prepare for such rapid movement. They sympathised more with the minorities than the politically active African, and felt more responsible for protecting the interests of these minorities than for preparing the African for self-government. If rapid constitutional advance was inevitable because of pressures external to Tanganyika, then safeguards must be entrenched within the constitution to protect the minorities and all that had been so far achieved.

Parity was but one of three principal recommendations which the Constitutional Committee made in 1951. It also recommended important decentralisation of government and the introduction of multi-racial local government. The Committee stressed the importance of this third recommendation and in fact wanted the reforms in the

[1] As far as I could gather the parity ratio was first suggested to the Constitutional Committee independently by several administrative officers. No government officer defended the majority's right to give a predominantly African character to the future political institutions of Tanganyika.

[2] Save of course for the groundnut scheme.

[3] Government Circular No. 4 of 1953.

[4] I was struck by the frequency with which observations of this nature appeared in material which I read in Tanganyika.

Legislative Council to wait upon the successful introduction of the multi-racial local authorities.

This was a new idea in East and Central Africa.[1] The development of local government had not been an aspect of the Colonial Office efforts in 1947 and 1948. It was not mentioned in the Constitutional Committee's terms of reference nor in the terms of reference given by the Committee to its three sub-committees. On at least two occasions the Government had specifically rejected the possibility of multi-racial local councils.[2]

Yet when the recommendation was made it was welcomed by the Governor. Professor MacKenzie was appointed as special commissioner to recommend in detail upon it and in 1953 a draft local Government Bill was presented to the Legislative Council. The Government had decided to promote a two-tier system. The higher tier was to be multi-racial county councils, each embracing several districts, large enough to afford their own staff and with extensive local government functions. They were to control the disposition of important local revenue and would be able to requisition further revenue from local councils, town councils and native authorities within their jurisdiction. The second tier was to be local councils, which normally would be established at the district level. They also would have their own revenue and functions and would not be subject to the control of the county councils.

The Local Government Ordinance was careful to permit any instrument establishing an authority to delimit its jurisdiction not only by area but also 'in respect of any particular class or description of persons in such area'.[3] This clause was inserted to permit the local councils to be purely African. The Ordinance was in fact a composite measure providing for what was to have been introduced as two separate bills. One was to allow for multi-racial authorities, the second for African local governments at the district level. In the final Ordinance the county council meets this first requirement and the local council the second. The clear intention was that as native authorities became competent to enjoy greater autonomy they would be 'promoted' to be local councils. They would therefore be African rather than multi-racial.

Once a local council had been introduced in a district the Native Authority Ordinance was no longer to apply to it. The council would take over the staff, the treasury and local government functions of the native authorities and the old native authority rules and orders would be re-enacted as local council laws. The position of the chiefs would not be abolished nor would the chiefs be brought under the control

[1] Or very nearly. Multi-racial district councils had been recommended for Nyasaland by R. S. Hudson in his *Report on the Development of Local Government in Nyasaland*, 1951.

[2] The Provincial Commissioners rejected the idea in 1949. In the same year, in his memorandum to the Constitutional Committee, Twining said: 'Rural local government must in practice be confined to the members of one race . . . It is not practicable to introduce non-native representation.'

[3] Section 8, 2 (a) of the Local Government Ordinance, No. 35 of 1953.

of the council.[1] They would still be responsible to the Central Government but their functions would be largely social and traditional. There is no doubt that the original intention was that once a local council was established it would replace the chiefs as the local authority in the district.[2]

The Ordinance amounted to a revolution in local government policy. A few months previously Twining had lectured the Secretary of State on the necessity 'of encouraging development by evolutionary methods'. He had quoted with favour Sir Donald Cameron's view that 'the indigenous system which had its foundations in the hearts and minds of the people had to be moulded to conform to modern ideas and higher standards but this could be done only by "enlisting the real force of the spirit of the people" ', and he concluded that 'nothing had yet been advanced to show the need for any radical departure from this basic principle'.[3] Yet in March 1952 he recommended for the Secretary of State's approval a county council system which would be multi-racial and supra-tribal and which in no way was in response to any felt need within the African community. The main explanation of this sudden change must be the commitment which Twining and his Government felt to the new objective of multi-racialism. Twining explained that he supported the county councils because they 'will afford the opportunity for non-Africans to participate in local government activities in rural areas'.[4] That was now a sufficient recommendation. In introducing the bill for its second reading the Minister of Local Government declared 'the underlying principle of the whole bill is inter-racial co-operation'.[5] This objective was replacing the previous preoccupation with the adaptation of tribal institutions. The older attitudes had been strongly reaffirmed in 1951 but they no longer had behind them the conviction of earlier decades. The older emphasis of Indirect Rule was out of date. The interdependence of the races must everywhere be acknowledged and made explicit.

Most administrators opposed what they regarded as the undue haste with which political advance was being conceded by Britain in most of the territories. The 'go slow' implications of concentrating first on local government reform were attractive and provided a further reason to support the county council idea.[6] Many administrators, and especially those of Provincial rank, had frequently supported greater decentralisation of the responsibility and authority that had been

[1] An African Chiefs Bill was introduced at the same time to define the control of the Central Government over the chiefs (No. 27 of 1953).

[2] The first draft of the Local Government Bill gave the local council the duty to enforce law and order and the right to amend customary law. These two powers are the central powers of a native authority under the classic Indirect Rule pattern.

[3] Despatch from the Governor of Tanganyika, 22 September 1950, No. 88, 1950. Reproduced in *Development of African Local Government in Tanganyika* (Col. No. 277, 1951).

[4] Ibid., page 32.

[5] Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Tanganyika. 27th Session, 9 July 1952, Col. 246.

[6] This may provide an uniting thread of consistency between the two despatches of Twining in September 1951 and March 1952. Though each recommended a very different approach to local government, each implied caution and delay in national political development.

concentrated in Dar es Salaam. By some of these the county councils were supported as a new opportunity for this.

There was no evidence that African support for county councils would develop spontaneously. Yet government officials were not apprehensive. Many other policies had been carried through successfully despite initial apathy and distrust. The Government were confident that on this issue too they could carry the African with them. 'While the problem as a whole (i.e. the need for multi-racialism) was clearly visible from the top . . . there was no demand at all for it at that time in County form. Yet for reasons of political stability it seemed essential to foster such a demand.'[1]

It is hard to assess to what extent African opinion was sought in the planning stages. A sub-committee of the Constitutional Committee toured the territory to hear evidence but as this Committee itself initiated the idea of multi-racial local authorities the only African reactions to the idea which it heard were those expressed, ad hoc, when Committee members put it to African witnesses. Caution, suspicion and hostility marked these reactions.[2] Professor MacKenzie and Mr. Hudson also toured the territory but their visits were hurried and most of their time was spent with government officers and local Europeans.[3] After the bill had been drafted native authorities were invited to comment upon it. There was not, there could not have been, the patient explanations over a long period which would have been necessary for an unformed African opinion to develop and be expressed. A contemporary comment confirms this. 'It is proposed to make an enabling law the implications and consequences of which are by no means clear to the general public and particularly to that overwhelming majority who neither have any knowledge of successful local government at the 'County' level nor even the physical opportunity of studying the Bill and the MacKenzie Report but have nevertheless been invited to comment to the Select Committee at what in view of the importance of the Bill is demonstrably short notice.'[4]

What African evidence there was suggested that African suspicions and fears of the whole project continued. From Bukoba for example came the view that 'we people of Tanganyika do not want to be in league with Europeans, Indians and Arabs as Tanganyikans because we do not share their countries . . . the British Government should know quite well that it was sent to this country in order to act as

[1] *Interim Report on the County Council in Tanganyika* 1951–56 (Dar es Salaam, cyclostyled), p. 2.

[2] Even at this early stage Committee members were obviously committed to county councils and were trying to sell them to witnesses. Several chiefs were lectured on racial interdependence when they spoke in reply in traditional trusteeship terms of the role of the Administration (Evidence and Memoranda submitted to the fact-finding sub-committee, 1950, Secretariat Library T 1146).

[3] At Iringa in the Southern Highland Province 21 notices were sent out inviting memoranda for Professor MacKenzie. Save for one on the D.C. notice board and another at the N.A.'s headquarters the notices went to European leaders and to centres where Europeans or Asians congregated.

[4] Evidence of the Provincial Commissioner of the Southern Highlands Province. Local Government Ordinance. Select Committee. Dar es Salaam Secretariat Archives 4163, Minute 59.

trustee for us. But if it starts bringing rules to colonize our country so that to make it become like Kenya we shall report the matter to UNO. Then we shall be given another power to act as trustee.'[1] More specific complaints came from African chiefs who feared the effect of the Ordinance upon their own position. They had already been under official pressure to share their power with native authority councils. Now new multi-racial councils were to be added while statutory local councils were gradually to replace the chiefs as the local authority.

The Government was in a difficult position on this matter. As a long-term policy it had decided that the chiefs must give way to local councils. Meanwhile the whole structure of local administration still depended very largely upon the chiefs. Their loyalty and co-operation had to be retained. The Government sought to reassure them through several amendments to the Local Government Bill. The duty of law enforcement was removed from the list of responsibilities of local councils and it was inserted into the African Chiefs Bill as a responsibility of the chiefs. The power to amend customary law was removed from the list of the permissive functions of the local councils. A new section provided that no county council would be introduced until the Minister was satisfied 'that there is among the inhabitants of and residents in the area concerned a general wish that the authority should be established'.[2] Chiefs were assured that it was intended to introduce local councils only in a few districts. The chiefs in the Legislative Council finally voted for the Bill but the fact remained that there was little in it to arouse their enthusiasm.

If the county councils were to be a genuine training ground in racial co-operation and in the responsible exercise of power then presumably they would have to have an unofficial majority, their own staff, their own revenue and a fair autonomy. However, after the Ordinance was passed and the Government undertook its detailed application these 'essentials' and the wider political objective that made them essential gave place to departmental and administrative considerations. Government departments were anxious to retain control over policy formation and over their field affairs. The Provincial Administration was anxious not to face strong representative councils. Neither the native authorities nor the district commissioners favoured any transfer of revenue or services from the native authorities to the county. The result was a great deal of inter-departmental bargaining. Instead of three or four county councils in the first year (as the Minister had predicted[3]), the first and only council, the South East Lake County Council, was not formally established until July 1955.

As it then emerged the County Council broke almost every maxim of successful local government. It was established over an enormous area of 25,000 square miles with a population of one and a quarter million

[1] No.35 of 1953, Section 3.
[2] Ibid.
[3] He had predicted a Sukuma County Council, a Kilimanjaro County Council and either a Makonde or a West Lake Council in the first year (Proceedings of the Legislative Council, 9 July 1953).

Africans. It included not only the five Sukumaland districts but also the districts of Musoma, North Moka and Ukekewe.[1] There were 17 government officers on a Council of 54 members. Of the remaining 37, 28 were African. They were all appointed and many of them were chiefs. Africans were represented in like proportions on the Council's committees. African representation was less on the District Committees that were set up soon after the Council was started in an effort to avoid overcentralisation at the County headquarters.

The County Council met twice yearly, for one or two days. It moved briskly through its agenda. The language was English, the whole tone of the meetings was Western and government officers dominated the procedure. There was little if anything to make the African aware that somehow this was his local government. 'Few people in the Lake Province were aware of what it did, considering it, if they gave the matter any thought, as "just another department of Government." '[2] The African members were in effect observers of a complex machinery that was kept in motion by its European official members. They quickly lost any interest which they might have had in it.[3] The Council could have been hardly less suited to the political purposes which it was originally planned to further.

Nor were there any compensating administrative advantages. The Council took over most of the field staff of the natural resources departments, as well as the revenue, functions and staff of two special development funds.[4] Almost all the senior officers were merely seconded to the Council. They continued to be subject to departmental control and they were liable to transfer at any time. Their loyalties and their main interest stayed with their department. The two funds which were transferred to the Council and the Council's general fund were each separately accounted. Administrative field officers had therefore to spend more time sorting their way through complex accounting procedures. The heavy representation of officials on the Council was inappropriate and could have embarrassed any officer who was outvoted on a matter for which he had departmental responsibility. Almost everyone resented the time wasted in Council and committee meetings. District Commissioners feared that this new Council might detract from the importance of the district administration and they tended to regard it as an encumbering intrusion.[5] Natural resources officers resented their loss of direct control over the expenditure of

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[1] These were added so that the Council would not seem to compete with the Sukumaland Federation, the great hope of Lake Province administrative officers a few years previously.

[2] *Interim Report* 1951–6, p. 12.

[3] The Standing Executive Committee consisted of 4 officials and 2 unofficials of each race. It met ten times in 1958. At seven of these meetings neither African was present and at no meeting were they both present (South East Lake County Council, Report of the Clerk of the Council, cyclostyled, 1958).

[4] The Sukumaland Development Fund and the grants from the Lint and Seed Marketing Board, previously disbursed by the Lake Province Cotton Committee. In 1956 they were to provide £168,000 out of the total Council revenue of £289,500 (South East Lake County Council, Expenditure and Revenue Estimates, 1956).

[5] The Clerk of the Council regarded the lack of co-operation by the District Commissioners as the main cause of the failure of the Council (Report of the Clerk of the Council).

the natural resources funds especially as the Provincial Administration ('the great unskilled' as one officer called them in this context) was so heavily represented on the County Council and its committees.

All that the County Council had come to mean was that government officers were wasting time and energy trying to work new and complicated political institutions which were in fact serving no useful political ends. Gradually the South East Lake County Council was wound up. No new county councils were started. There could hardly have been a more complete collapse of a project that had been heralded for four years as a creative experiment in multi-racialism and as an important and essential stage in Tanganyika's constitutional development.

At the same time, 'multi-racialism' was being hard pressed in national affairs. In 1954 the Tanganyika African National Union had been formed and by 1957 it had grown into a substantial movement. For the first four years of its existence there was a great deal of hostility between the Government and TANU. Roland Young has said that the main difference between them was over the question of timing, of 'when they are ready for it'.[1] This I think has been true only since 1958. Before that TANU was more than a nationalist movement which wished the Government to move faster along a path which was acceptable to both. TANU challenged the Government's whole conception of how Tanganyika ought to develop. It rejected parity and pressed for a categorical statement that Tanganyika would develop as a primarily African state. This assurance the Government would not give. It held firmly to its previous plans for the constitutional development of Tanganyika.

This conflict between the African nationalism of TANU and the 'multi-racialism' of the Government gave an extra bitterness to political controversy in Tanganyika. TANU feared the worst of Government policy. It saw the alternatives as a Ghana-type evolution towards self-government under an African government or a Central-African-type evolution in which the minorities would be entrenched in a powerful, perhaps dominant position.

It is I think true to say that for several years the Government and those friendly to it sought to check and frustrate the growth of TANU and to direct African political activity into other channels. At least ten branches of TANU were refused registration under the wide powers assumed by the Government in the same year that TANU was founded.[2] TANU branches were kept out of the whole of the Lake Province. In districts where TANU branch officers threatened public order or undermined the authority of the chiefs, the Government acted against the branches. In 1957 at least four branches were closed.[3]

[1] H. Fosbrooke and R. A. Young, *Smoke in the Hills* (North Western University Press, 1960), p. 177.

[2] The Societies Ordinance. No. 13 of 1954.

[3] Korogwe, Pangani, Handeni and Iringa (Government Notices Nos. 27, 139, 140 and 361 of 1957). Typical offences that led to these decisions were the usurping of judicial authority by a branch official, the refusal to acknowledge the jurisdiction of a local court and the encouragement of disobedience to lawful native authority orders.

For several months Julius Nyerere, the President of TANU, was prohibited from making public speeches. It cannot be said categorically that there was more to these acts than the legitimate concern to maintain law and order. But true or not, the impression was certainly created that the Government was using every pretext to curb TANU's growth.[1]

At the same time the Government sought to bolster the strength of tribalism and to sustain the prestige of the chiefs as a counterbalance to TANU. District officers were encouraged to develop village councils 'in order to canalise nationalism into tribal patriotism'. The Haya, Hehe and Chagga, all strongly tribal in their loyalties, were examples of what was to be encouraged. Official interest was revived in Provincial Councils in the hope that they might provide a 'counter entrenched in advance to political irresponsibility'. A Council of Chiefs was set up in 1957 in the clear hope that it would be an alternative outlet for the expression of African political opinions and that it might develop into a second chamber, a Council of State, to counterbalance a popularly elected lower house. Government statements, and especially those of Governor Twining, resounded with fulsome references to the importance of the chiefs. While the Government pursued these policies directly, 26 of the 30 unofficial members whom Twining had appointed to the Legislative Council formed the United Tanganyika Party. It was in effect the party of 'multi-racialism' and it sought to win inter-racial support for the general line of policy which the Government was pursuing. Its leadership was largely European but it claimed a majority of African members. The Government permitted and some officers encouraged African chiefs to join the United Tanganyika Party and for a brief period numbers of the important chiefs did lend their name to it. In contrast to this the Administration made it very clear to the chiefs that TANU was not to be supported or encouraged and when the first elections approached the chiefs were advised to agree on whom to support for 'otherwise only extremists would be supported', as one Government official explained.

Sometime between May 1957 and October 1958 Government policy changed decisively. 'Multi-racialism', the attempt to entrench the special representation of the minorities, was abandoned and the Administration prepared itself to hand over power to a nationalist government in the near future. Though I doubt that its full implication was then realised, the crucial decision was made in the summer of 1957, when the Government agreed that the elections should be held for all of the thirty unofficial members of the Legislative Council rather than in several constituencies only, as it had earlier announced. A strong measure of multi-racialism was retained. The franchise was a qualified one (with the qualifications £150 a year or two years'

[1] *The Times* itself commented on the appearance of political repression in Tanganyika, 24 May 1957.

secondary education or experience in specified offices) and the parity formula continued. There were ten constituencies and each voter had to vote for one candidate of each race. But as MacKenzie had foreseen, any common roll was bound to have a large African majority and thus the equalising of political power amongst the races, the central purpose of 'multi-racialism', was destroyed.

In October 1958 elections were held in five of the ten constituencies. TANU demonstrated the massive support which it had gained for itself. It won all five African seats and in all the contested Asian-European seats it mobilised the African voters to elect only TANU-approved candidates. In the second round of elections, in February 1959, for the remaining fifteen seats, only TANU candidates were nominated for the African seats, and for the two Asian and one European seats that were contested the TANU-approved candidates won easily. 'Multi-racialism' had failed politically. The U.T.P. had not won a single seat and was soon completely inactive.

The chiefs also failed to provide an effective political counterbalance to TANU. In many districts the chiefs bore the first brunt of TANU activity. Many of them saw more quickly than did the Government that their local position would be impossible if they were irretrievably allied with the Government against TANU. Circumspectly but clearly some sought to make their peace with TANU. Then in 1958 Chief Fundikira, a leading member of the Chiefs' Convention, announced that he would run for the Legislative Council with TANU support. The Convention backed his decision and urged a reconciliation between Government and TANU. In March 1959, before the opening of the new Legislature, the chiefs supported a rapid advance to self-government under a predominantly African government. Moreover they wished this to receive immediate publicity so that they might avoid political criticism if he new Governor, Sir Richard Turnbull, were to try to perpetuate 'multi-racialism'.

In fact the Tanganyika Government accepted the inevitable and on 17 March 1959 the long-sought categorical assurance was made that Tanganyika would advance as a primarily African state. The parity formula was abandoned in the appointments of the unofficial ministers and Tanganyika began its rapid and tranquil advance to the responsible Government with an African majority which it now enjoys.

Before this however one final effort had been made to inject 'multi-racialism' into African local government. So evident had been the faults of the South East Lake County Council that both Wallis and the Government decided that multi-racial local authorities had not been given an adequate test. The most obvious fault was that the 'county' was artificial and too large and was without roots in either the traditions of the people or the administrative structure of the government. 'For day to day administration only a handful of people ever cast their thoughts above district level.'[1] This then was the highest possible level

[1] Wallis, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

of local government. The Government determined in 1956 to introduce multi-racial district local authorities. There were two ways in which this could be done. Multi-racial authorities could be placed alongside the native authorities or native authority councils could be converted into multi-racial local authorities.

After several unsuccessful experiments with the former approach in 1956, the Government decided to encourage the second approach.[1] It became 'a matter to which the Governor attaches great importance'.[2] Many district officers had their doubts but by 1957 the native authorities of thirty districts had been persuaded to accept non-African members or observers on their councils or on special advisory committees. The Government hoped to introduce full district councils into a substantial number of these districts within the year.

But what of all the arguments of a few years previously that multi-racial local councils were inappropriate at the district level? Would Africans accept non-African membership in councils that had long been all African? Could the tribal character of the authorities, so assiduously encouraged for so long, be abandoned without serious opposition? Could the relations between the chiefs and the councils be sorted out satisfactorily? Could non-Africans be brought under the full jurisdiction of these councils? Were they competent enough to become autonomous local authorities? There were in fact no reasons to expect that these questions could be answered any more in the affirmative than in 1955. It is a clear measure of the Government's determination to pursue 'multi-racialism' that multi-racial district councils were promoted so extensively in 1957 and 1958.

In one sense becoming a district council meant very little to a native authority council. The council came under the new Ordinance and thus had clearly defined statutory powers. But there was very little immediate change in the powers, finances or functions of the council. Nor was its autonomy increased. Government officers still ran most of the services which were nominally local government functions. No secondment of staff accompanied the district council status and no department was willing to transfer local services to the jurisdiction of the new councils. The only specific changes were that the council took over financial responsibility for Grade B roads (though usually not executive responsibility) and it received several additional sources of revenue from various central government licences and fees. Neither change was important.

What was important was that a few non-Africans (the number varied from four to ten) were brought into the council and the non-Africans in the district came under the jurisdiction of the council. This involved its own difficulties. On several important issues the Government was unable, or felt itself unable, to carry through its policy consistently. The local by-laws of a council were to apply to all residents

[1] Newala Council, established in 1954, was a successful example of what the Government wished to achieve.

[2] I am informed that the policy was recommended for action with these words.

of the district, African and non-African, but any infringement by a non-African would be heard in a magistrate's court, not in a native court as would African infringements. Secondly it was decided that it would be inappropriate to allow a multi-racial council to consider amendments to customary law and this native authority power was not taken over by the councils. Thirdly the Government was unwilling to abandon its whole native authority system and to rely solely on district council by-laws for the regulation of local affairs. Moreover there were certain of the rule-making powers of the native authorities to which the Government did not wish to subject non-Africans but which it also did not wish to abolish altogether. The most important example of these was the power of the chiefs to call out African communal labour for public purposes. The African Chiefs (Special Powers) Ordinance[1] was therefore passed. This Ordinance in effect perpetuated the whole framework of native administration, including the rule-making powers of chiefs, alongside of the local government in any district where a district council is introduced.

The Government made every effort to ease the first introduction of non-African members. All former members of the native authority councils were nominated to be members of the new district councils and they always greatly outnumbered the non-African. District officers could argue with all logic that the changes would in no way threaten African political control in rural local government.

Many of the thirty councils which had accepted some form of consultation with non-Africans balked at carrying it further.[2] Other councils set conditions, such as that the African members could reconsider their participation after three years. In the final event district councils were established in only eight districts.[3] None of these districts had highly developed native authorities and most of them were among the least political districts in the territory. Within fifteen months African opposition was so strong in four of these districts that their district councils had to be disbanded.

Politically sophisticated Africans explain their opposition to the district councils as a rejection of the special and vastly disproportionate representation of non-Africans which these councils included. Less sophisticated reactions revealed deep fears and an extreme distrust which perhaps are more adequate explanations of the intensity of African hostility to the councils. They saw the proposals as a first stage in a devious scheme to steal African land. They feared to admit any non-Africans lest, once the principle was conceded, the numbers of non-African members would then be increased. They feared the influence which even a few non-Africans would have because of their

[1] No. 42 of 1957.

[2] The requirement still held 'that the Minister shall satisfy himself . . . that there is among the inhabitants of and residents in the area concerned a general wish that the authority should be established' (No. 35 of 1953, Section 3). But in practice this meant no more than an affirmative vote in the Native Authority Council. In one district even that condition does not appear to have been met.

[3] Nzega, Pangani, Geita, Mongani, Kondoa, Tundura, Mtwara, Masasi. Local councils continued in Mafia and Newala.

knowledge and wealth. In any case they did not want non-African membership in councils which had always been entirely African and which in many cases were the accepted heirs of traditional political authority.

The Provincial Administration might have been able to carry the councils through in an earlier more tranquil period, but not in 1958.[1] District after district was undergoing what were almost political and social revolutions. TANU branches were formed, government policies were challenged and chiefs, as the immediate agents of British rule, were under strong attack.[2] The question of the district councils became entangled in the struggle between TANU and the Government over the nature of Tanganyika's future constitutional development—understandably, for the councils were an integral part of the Government's policy of multi-racialism. As TANU's organisation and strength spread, so also did African opposition to the councils. TANU's supporters gave voice and focus to African fears and no doubt further stimulated them. By February 1959 African opposition in four districts was unanimous and total local government had been brought to a halt and public order was seriously threatened. The Government had no choice but to abandon these four councils.

It was not a temporary setback. It was the end of multi-racialism in rural local government. A new review of local government policy was begun by a committee of the Executive Council. But the time is now past when British officials alone can plan and introduce major policy changes. The next reforms will be those approved, if not planned, by TANU Ministers.

In 1951 the Provincial Administration was seeking to transform the native authorities into representative African local governments. For eight years this, the logical and usual development from the older native administration policy, gave way to the pursuit of 'multi-racialism'. The older objective was never lost sight of but progress towards it was inevitably less. Energies were divided, talents wasted and the remaining initiative of the Provincial Administration was squandered in this unsuccessful effort to introduce multi-racialism into rural local government.

Nor did the effort to entrench special minority representation help the minorities. It aroused racial antagonism and endangered rather than safeguarded the interest and security of these minorities. It is only after this effort has been abandoned that race relations have improved and the minorities have regained a measure of their earlier security. One case does not permit a generalisation but such at least has been the experience in Tanganyika.

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[1] This opinion was expressed to me several times by administrative officers.

[2] This was especially true in those districts where the chiefs were enforcing compulsory agricultural, soil conservation or veterinary rules.

OVERSEAS STUDENTS AT LEICESTER UNIVERSITY: SOME PROBLEMS OF ADJUSTMENT AND COMMUNICATION

J. E. T. ELDRIDGE

The universities of this country provide an interesting and important laboratory for the student of race relations. In his book *Negroes in Britain*, Dr. K. Little observed that:

> It is not widely appreciated that very many of the future leaders of the British colonial areas spend two or more years in this country at a most impressionable period of their lives; or that the ideas and notions that they obtain here of British people and European ways are likely in the long run to influence some sixty million coloured people abroad.

The observations that follow are drawn from an investigation that was undertaken by the present writer at Leicester University from 1957 to 1959. The university is in many ways typical of English provincial universities and it is felt that the ensuing discussion may well be of relevance to Redbrick generally and not just to Leicester in particular. The purpose of this article is two-fold: firstly, to describe some of the factors that are likely to affect the ways in which overseas students adjust to life in this country, and in particular to the student community; secondly, to discuss some of the barriers that impede effective communication between English and overseas students. These two aspects are not unrelated. The main ethnic groups that come within the scope of this discussion are the Nigerian, the Sudanese, the West Indian, the Indian and the Kenyan Indian.

I.

Many students from abroad are met by representatives of the British Council. Some of them attend courses arranged by this body. In the literature of the British Council the purpose of the Introduction Course is described as follows:

> . . . to help the newly arrived student to adjust himself to a new environment. It has been found that students, particularly those whose background is most dissimilar from our own, have experienced difficulty in adjusting themselves to our mode of life. The impact of arrival upon a student in this category is to produce an unhappy condition of mind. He is overawed by what he sees, cannot relate it to what he knows, feels isolated and is quite sure that he is the only one who has suffered in this way.
>
> Before any instruction can usefully be given, this condition of mind must be broken down and confidence restored. For this reason, we have found that the resident courses, where students have the factor of newness in common, provide the best means of overcoming their diffidence.

A number of overseas students said they were glad of the help they received from the British Council through attendance at such courses, but the general activities of the Council were certainly not above strong adverse criticism and engendered a certain amount of suspicion. There were two very clear examples of this from Nigerian students. The first referred to 'the dangerous influence of the British Council'. He said that there was a tendency to place too much emphasis on the British tradition. This helped to create a Nigerian bourgoisie whose social attitudes when they returned home did not fit the Nigerian situation. Furthermore, he felt that there was always the underlying assumption that British cultural values were superior to Nigerian cultural values. This may produce within a Nigerian student feelings of inferiority. He feels he has nothing to contribute to his new social environment and is therefore likely to withdraw into himself. At best he only associates with his fellow countrymen and at worst he isolates himself altogether and becomes very lonely.

Secondly, in his opinion, the values the British Council disseminated to overseas students, the manners and the ways of behaviour it taught, were those of the upper classes into which such students are rarely able to penetrate. They are thus poorly equipped for the actual situations in which they find themselves. This can lead to the embarrassment of producing, so to speak, the right manners in the wrong places. This, he felt, encouraged Nigerian students to rotate among themselves. Thus, in the summer vacation there was a drift of Nigerian students to London where they form a pocket-like group and, in effect, become fettered to one another.

The same student also considered that the British Council was an agent for tracking down the political activities of students from overseas. It was in close liaison with the Government and contained spies who reported on marked men. For this reason it was a body to avoid. This view, he claimed, was shared by all 'progressive Nigerians'.

The other Nigerian said that in his opinion membership of a British Council club was not worth much apart from the rather luxurious London branch, as there was a lack of diversity in the programmes. He then expostulated:

> It's a swindle . . . They try and make us believe in Nigeria that the British Council is not associated with the Government but is financed by well-meaning English people. Then we come here and find it is financed 100 per cent. by the Treasury. So, even though they provide almost indispensable services in some parts of Nigeria, particularly an excellent library service, we become disillusioned about it and want nothing more to do with it. Those who run the British Council can be considered no different than civil servants. If only they would come out into the open about it and admit that the British Council is a propaganda machine we wouldn't mind. But it makes us very bitter when we think that we have been deceived in this way . . .

The extent to which the assertions of these students are true is no doubt a matter for debate, but the fact that they are made at all seems

to indicate that at an 'official' level, the reception of overseas students into this country leaves something to be desired.

Most overseas students who come to Leicester University are financed by their Governments. Because such scholarships are not nearly so plentiful as the number available to English students through their Local Authorities, they are more conscious of being the 'chosen few' and are generally desirous of justifying the trust placed in them. They like to think of themselves as ambassadors for their country and are particularly anxious to succeed in the academic sphere. A feeling of responsibility is perhaps especially noticeable among West African students. As people receiving an English education they are very much looked up to by the other members of their kinship groups. Through letters from home the student is reminded that he is representing his family and the social stigma attached to failure can scarcely be over-estimated. It is better not to have come to England than to have come and failed. It is known that some students stay in England rather than return to their country without the qualification for which they had aimed. However, Sudanese students do not appear to have the same problem in this respect. Even if they return home unqualified they still are able to command worthwhile posts.

For many overseas students the attainment of an English degree is the 'Open Sesame' to high posts in their respective countries. One only has to recall that many of the present political leaders in the Caribbean and West Africa owe much of their success to their English education to realise that this is so. In consequence there is a greater sense of destiny among these students than among their English counterparts, for whom the way to the top is by no means so clear cut. Thus the pre-eminent desire to obtain a degree is not only related to such negative factors as the stigma attached to failure but also to the positive factor of the opportunity that awaits the successful graduate on his return: the very highest social positions and all the comforts and privileges of an educated *élite*. It is not surprising therefore that most of the social activities of the student community are seen as very secondary in many instances. The university is thought of as a place of pilgrimage and only valuable inasmuch as it leads to higher things. Such social activity as they do have is, in the main, confined to members of their own ethnic group.

The significance of this attitude towards the university student community is brought out when one compares the social function which it serves for many English students. These students are considerably younger than most of their overseas counterparts. Even those who have done national service are relatively inexperienced. Therefore the opportunities for leadership in various aspects of university life, and the scope to develop latent talents or particular interests, are taken by many of them. This is the time to learn something of the give and take of committee membership, to test one's organising ability, to learn a few of the tricks of diplomacy via the Students' Union and to see the response to one's effort at oratory in the debating chamber. It is not

surprising that, in view of the value that such experience can be in the world at large, the community is treated as a training ground for the development of social skills. This concept of the community helps to explain the fact that high social status is accorded to those who exercise positions of responsibility and leadership within it. Very few overseas students benefit in this way from the prestige conferred on student leaders by virtue of their position in the student community.

There are other factors that also encourage or accentuate the tendency of many overseas students not to participate in the social aspects of the student community. For example, many overseas students find that they have to work harder than English students. The implication here is not that these students are intellectually inferior to English students. There is no evidence to justify such an assumption. What is true, however, is that most of them have to graduate in a language that is not their own. This means that the rate of reading in many cases is slower than the average English student's. It is quite common for overseas students to have recourse to correspondence tuition as supplementary to their lectures at the university. This is discouraged by the university authorities but nevertheless continues and has been known to last all through a student's university career. It is customary for overseas students to excuse themselves from joining in some activity or other connected with the student community on the grounds that they have work to do.

The problem of language is one which faces many overseas students. It can be particularly acute in the first few months after arrival in England. Some students are taught English at home by their own countrymen and find that actually speaking with English people demands certain changes in pronunciation. To add to their difficulties they have to try and cope with the wide variety of regional accents present among English students. This clearly can act as an effective deterrent to active participation in the life of the student community. The severity of this handicap differs of course from person to person. It is by no means insurmountable, for some overseas students who have desired to enter into the life of the student community have been willing to speak at debates and Union meetings. However, related as it often is with the other factors already outlined, it assumes added importance in its effect on the processes of adjustment. One Sudanese student wrote with feeling:

> Being in his 'natural habitat', the English student is more 'natural', free and confident than the foreign and coloured student. Coloured students, for reasons, worry too much about their work and exams. They complain too much about weather and food. Maybe the change of habitat, language difficulties, differences of culture and background make the coloured student seem to compare unfavourably in his sense of humour, wit etc. with the English student.

Certainly the easiest mechanism of adjustment is for an overseas student to stay with members of his own ethnic group, or if he is a sole

representative of his country, with other overseas students, who are in a similar position. Thus the International Society and the national grouping can given the individual a feeling of belonging, and act as a buffer against all that is strange and unknown in the wider society. Furthermore, when students from the minority ethnic groups are only here for a temporary period, the incentive to become at all involved with the host society is very much lessened. This was put quite bluntly by an Indian student from Kenya:

> It is difficult to make friends here but quite frankly I don't want to as I have friends among my own countrymen. Apart from X, I know no one very well.

He added that it was his intention to restrict his contacts with English people as far as possible.

Thus group formation on the basis of ethnic groups appears to be almost inevitable and is perpetuated year after year. Overseas students coming into the university were inducted into these particular groupings and were expected to remain with them, thus generating feelings of solidarity and increasing the strength of their protective function. While there were a few notable exceptions there was a definite tendency for English and overseas students to segregate for the more informal extra-curricular activities of student life. Even given a desire on their part to become more integrated in the student community, the very fact that they were generally slower to find their feet in their new surroundings meant that friendship cliques were already formed among English students, making their task of breaking in more formidable. A certain dissatisfaction was evident among English students with regard to the lack of participation and leadership of overseas students in Union affairs. One student commented:

> The position is very satisfactory with regard to the very few outstanding people who bring new ideas and new points of view into the Union. Presumably it is the best of these students who come to British universities, who are, at the same time, older and more experienced than us. One would expect most of them, therefore, to make a more important contribution to the Union than the majority do. The women seem to be the most unsatisfactory among these people and one feels that they have more to give than they seem prepared to do.

II

For reasons that are legion the meaningful framework upon which an individual can base his actions in society has, in many instances, been severely tampered with. On reflection, it is not surprising that there should be an element of uncertainty in relationships between people from the colonies and English people. Changing the official ideology from one of Empire, with its implications of English domination and superiority, to one of Commonwealth, with its implications of co-operation on an equal basis, cannot but cause confusion in the first instance as to the role one should adopt. The master-servant relationship, while it was accepted by both parties, was defined clearly and

unambiguously and therefore the role relationship was equally clear. But now there is a conflict between the old norms that governed the relationship and the new standards which the Government has officially adopted. The master-servant relationship thus receives no longer the same degree of social sanction, but, at the same time, there are still strong social and psychological barriers put up against the acceptance of what might be called 'ethnic egalitarianism'. How to act in the presence of a member of another ethnic group is no longer clear. Because the concept of social equality has emerged in this context, without, at the same time, having been fully accepted by either side, uncertainty as to how to act in one another's presence becomes a common feature.

In the university context, English students find a conflict between the conventional stereotypes which they have of colonial people as conveyed through out of date text books at school and through mass media on the one hand, and liberal beliefs in the rights of man, in social equality, and in judging a person empirically on his worth as a person on the other. The conflict is manifested in the initial self-consciousness which many English students feel in the presence of an overseas student. The very presence of educated 'coloured' people is likely to bring him up with a jolt. Such a person does not fit into the conventional category with which one associates 'coloured' people and therefore the whole question as to how to act towards him has to be re-assessed. One English student, reflecting on his own experience, said:

> . . . It did strike me. I don't know why or how but I do remember the first time I met one of the West Indians I was perhaps more patronising than I needed to be, or ought to be, or than I would have been with an English student. But it soon passes off when you realise that they are probably far more intelligent than you are.

A number of writers have pointed out that in our society the Negro is the archetypal stranger and that the characteristic English reserve is even more pronounced where he is concerned. It is suggested that the element of uncertainty involved in entering into a relationship with him in particular and with strangers from overseas in general is likely to be heightened by the role conflict which has been described. Something of a vicious circle appears to be created. The role conflict itself poses problems of communication. It tends to discourage contact between members of different ethnic groups, which in itself complicates the existing problems of communication. The situation over the years becomes institutionalised and the groupings exercise a considerable degree of social control over their members, so that it is 'odd' to associate too much with a member of another ethnic group and certain things that one would speak about quite normally with members of one's own ethnic group become taboo when speaking to someone else. Some concrete examples taken from discussions with students and from their written comments will serve to illustrate this.

An English student wrote to the student newspaper, *Ripple*, in the following vein:

> Following the debate on social equality, I would like to make these comments: Hearing Mr. M., a coloured student, repeat himself I was tempted to cry, 'We heard you the first time!' I restrained myself. It is perhaps pertinent to ask myself why . . . There is an unfortunate attitude towards coloured students. It is considered unethical to barrack them at meetings, however bad or senseless the point they are making. This seems to me to be bad, not only because I am a sadist and enjoy heckling people, but also because it indicates a general trend, that one must never criticise a person because of his colour.
>
> Can it be that white students consider themselves superior? Can it be that coloured students consider themselves inferior, and are thus more sensitive? Both attitudes are to be deplored. White students have no right to feel superior, nor coloured students to feel inferior; one has only to read the examination list to realise this truth.
>
> Why then, in a supposedly progressive university, is there this stupid taboo against criticism of overseas students?

This 'racial discrimination backwards', as one student put it, was further stressed by another student when he wrote:

> It seems to me that a great deal of the tension between coloured and white students in the university is due to the fact that we are frightened of offending them, and consequently our attitude to them is different from our attitude to fellow white students. For example, coloured students are never hissed during debates. The girls are frightened of offending them at hops if they refuse to dance with them because it will seem a reflection on their colour. We are all very colour-conscious.'

The following remarks of an English student who, unlike most of his fellow English students, had a great deal of contact with overseas students, reveal something of his own emotional problems and an insight into the attitude of many members of his ethnic group towards him and towards the overseas students:

> There are certain people who take a biased opinion against overseas students and this is reflected in the person who befriends them . . . I mean I've heard comments against it and things like that . . . Well, if you don't mind those and if you're willing to resist those and not going to be overcome by them . . . just not be overcome by what other people think, then I think you're on the right road . . . I mean there's nothing peculiar about them . . . I think that's one of the dangers to think there's something about them, but what we have to feel is that they're just quite natural, normal . . . and that in befriending them we personally might come up against opposition from other people and we've got to face up to it . . . It really means that because people are forced into two camps almost, certain people avoid overseas students almost unconsciously . . . you find that you're within a group with which other people don't so much associate. You find, for instance, in very practical things, if you go into the refectory, with

> a group of overseas students . . . you might be amongst them or perhaps another student is with you, but you find that other groups don't join you . . . They automatically associate you with that group as a separate group. Now this reflects not so much on them but it reflects on you . . . I mean, if you've got no self-consciousness about it and if you're willing to face up to the fact that there is going to be this certain bias by people against them and ultimately against you because you're associating with them, I think it's all right . . .
>
> The bias against you is the bias against them which is not definite antagonism but is, 'Well, why should we be friendly towards them? They're a group by themselves, they've got their own friends, why should we associate with them as opposed to anyone else?' It's that kind of feeling that's reflected in a way in the attitude that it's rather strange that you want to be friendly with them and not be satisfied at just being friendly with Europeans, I think . . . Nothing against you or anything like that; it's probably just a sense that it's rather unusual . . . They recognise that you have to go out of your way and they can't recognise why you go out of your way to be friendly with them . . .

One can see that the psychological effect on the non-conforming member is not inconsiderable. This English student found himself alienated from his own ethnic group. This is by no means complete but it is felt by the student—'They automatically associate you with that group as a separate group'. Deviation from the tacitly accepted group *mores* gives rise to some emotional conflict within the individual. It is clear that this student's relations with English students were affected by his 'unusual' involvement with overseas students (although he did not like to feel that this was so). The sanctions of this implicit code are instrumental in deterring many group members from 'aberrant behaviour' in this respect. Even when one's conviction as to how to behave towards members of other ethnic groups differs from the accepted standards, the conviction has to be held with considerable intensity before one in fact traverses the conventional pattern of behaviour.

The relationships between members of the English and overseas ethnic groups involves a certain amount of trial and error. Initial failures can be very discouraging and sometimes embarrassing:

> The way they go around in groups is due to the fact that most people treat them with more reserve than they treat English people. Until very recently I used to be very chary of saying anything at all to a coloured student because, well, on one occasion, it must have been some years ago now, I cracked a joke which was very badly received, completely misunderstood in fact, and I just hate to do that, to hurt anybody unintentionally . . . and I think that attitude is shown by a lot of other people, that you must be very careful with overseas students in case any misunderstanding occurs . . .

Or again:

> We've got to bear in mind that many of these students do have a different sense of humour. I remember one instance with A. where

> we went to him, two of us for quite some time, apparently serious about some subject he was taking . . . And he took it quite seriously and we didn't realise at the time he was taking it seriously . . . And he was quite depressed by this and he came round to see me later on in the evening and I realised this and put it right with him. I changed my attitude with reference to that sort of thing now . . . but I realised then that he had taken it seriously, where an Englishman I think would nine out of ten times take it as a joke.

Thus it was found here by the hard experience of failure that the English idea of 'kidding' as a form of humour does not enjoy universal recognition.

For anyone seeking to enter into a social relationship with an overseas student the process was not always easy. He did not necessarily find a student who was eager for his friendship, at least not initially, for as one student put it, 'They are very conscious of people's motives in being interested in them.' One student described the reaction of a group of overseas students, one of whom he knew, when he joined them:

> I've discovered that when I go up to say, J. K. and I say 'Hiya J.', they all go quiet. They all shut up while I'm there. And if I stick around they remain quiet or push off. In other words, there appears to be no desire for them to accept me as another student into their conversation. If I try to push myself in, I just won't get in, nothing doing.

The subtle nuances implicit in communication with other individuals can scarcely be over-estimated. But where there is a background of shared experiences among group members, there is likely to be a more sensitive appreciation of the words that are used in conversation, the ability to take things for granted without having to elaborate, and less likelihood of misunderstanding. Where there are individuals from different societies, the background of shared experience is limited considerably. In consequence, the difficulties of communication are likely to lead only to superficial relationships between them, unless positive and persistent efforts to overcome these difficulties are made. For those who would wish to see the barriers to effective communication broken down, the success of the few provide grounds for hope. The following comment from a Sudanese student indicates a mature understanding of the situation in which he found himself and a recognition of the importance of time in developing a satisfactory relationship with English students:

> With time one gets to understand the nature of the Englishman, that is humour reactions etc., and definitely like them very much. I find them far more generous and cheerful than I thought. They are as straightforward, direct, helpful and decent as I expected. Colour prejudice, though sometimes embarrassing, does not annoy me. When mutual understanding on a friendly and equal basis develops, colour or racial prejudice disappears.

The strong tendency to voluntary segregation on a basis of one's ethnic grouping which the preceding discussion of the problems of

adjustment and communication suggests, may be felt by many not to be conducive to healthy ethnic relations. The stereotypes which one group tends to hold concerning another may be kept relatively intact and, indeed, reinforced. The overseas student may criticise the ignorance of some English students on colonial matters and their patronising spirit. He may return more hostile to the British than when he came. The English student may criticise the lack of participation and interest of the overseas student in student affairs and say as one exasperated student did, 'If you go out of your way for them they feel they are being patronised and if you don't they feel they are being slighted. Either way it is a vicious circle.' It is undoubted that the relationships of English to overseas students will have a profound effect on the future since it is in the universities that the countries of the world find their leaders. A constructive social policy designed to assist students and given them greater awareness of the situation in which they find themselves, for the purpose of improving ethnic relations, is surely called for.

THE FRENCH RACIAL SCENE: NORTH AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE*

VERNON WAUGHRAY

The Nottingham and Notting Dale troubles and the subsequent tension appear to have generated a fairly widespread feeling that Britain is unlucky, and that this is due to the official 'open-door' policy towards coloured British subjects. It is not generally known in Britain that coloured French subjects also have the right to enter the Mother Country and that there are at present approximately 500,000 coloured people resident in metropolitan France (i.e., 1·2 per cent. of the total population). This figure includes both aliens and French citizens. Absolutely there are, therefore, twice as many and relatively three times as many coloured people in France as in Great Britain, where the total coloured population is approximately 220,000. In Britain, the arrival of a thousand West Indians disturbs many, but that numbers do not signify much *per se* is surely borne out by the fact that there has apparently never been a 'race riot' in France.

From a demographic point of view, however, Britain is not an immigrant country. With over 50 million inhabitants she has one of the highest population densities in the world. On the other hand, France, a larger country with a smaller population, can be regarded as an immigrant country, as the following figures indicate.

In 1946 there were 1,743,600 aliens resident in France and on 31 December 1951 the total was 1,869,600. The breakdown by nationality was:

	1946	*31 Dec. 1951*
Italians	450,800	598,500
Spaniards	302,200	346,200
Poles	423,500	332,000
Belgians	153,300	132,900
Germans	24,900	69,300
Swiss	53,500	55,000
Others	335,400	335,700
	1,743,600	1,869,600

The May 1954 census showed a total alien population of 1,452,000 and it is estimated to be about 1,500,000 today. In 1946 the total French population was approximately 40 million and on 1 January 1954 about 43 million. At present it is estimated to be about 45 million. The total Muslim Algerian population in France today is approximately 400,000,[1] i.e., 0·9 per cent. of the total population. Therefore there are at present about 4 aliens (mostly white Europeans) to 1

* Every effort has been made to obtain accurate data. The 'facts and figures' on Numbers, Distribution, Employment etc., are approximate and should be regarded as such. Most of the statistical information was issued by the appropriate Ministries, Census authorities etc.

[1] General de Gaulle's figure, Press conference, 5 September 1960, as reported in *The Times*.

Muslim Algerian (French citizen) resident in France. In 1953, however, the proportion was about 7 to 1. About 1 in every 12 adult male breadwinners resident in France is either Muslim Algerian or alien. The great dependence of the French economy on immigrant labour is shown by the fact that since 1950 over 400,000 alien workers (excluding Algerians, who are French citizens) have been allowed to live in France, as this table shows.[1]

	Agriculture	*Metals*	*Building trades*	*Other activities*	*Total*
1950	4,556	981	1,681	3,239	10,457
1951	6,245	2,136	3,600	8,902	20,883
1952	11,388	3,369	10,892	7,020	32,669
1953	6,237	871	4,387	3,644	15,139
1954	4,231	603	3,975	3,326	12,135
1955	4,759	811	9,420	3,942	18,932
1956	9,617	11,306	33,685	10,748	65,356
1957	10,607	17,861	51,943	31,263	111,674
1958	10,728	14,892	29,553	27,635	82,808
1959	7,242	5,890	12,510	18,533	44,175
1960	(first four months)				14,897

In addition, there were 56,969 seasonal workers in France in 1957, 63,530 in 1958, 63,797 in 1959 and 23,328 in the first four months of this year. The vast majority of the non-seasonal workers were Italian (80,000 in 1957 and 21,262 in 1959). Spanish immigration was the second largest (23,096 in 1957 and 14,716 in 1959), with the Portuguese, Germans, Belgians and Swiss bringing up the rear in that order.[1]

Before placing the immigration of coloured French subjects, and particularly Muslim Algerians, in the context of the French racial *mélange* we should note the significance of the above figures. There is little doubt that France is on the threshold of a major expansion of the national economy. The rate of growth of French industrial production is much higher than the British. It has been estimated recently that with the existing plant and labour force French production can be increased by 9 per cent. and the third *plan d'équipement* estimated that at least 50,000 immigrant workers will be needed each year. By 1970 the total working population will have increased by more than one million compared with today (20,291,000 as against 19,231,000). French exports are now about 60 per cent. higher in terms of volume than they were when General de Gaulle took office and the real value of exports of French goods rose by 20 per cent. between 1958 and 1959. French industry has been revitalised and it now looks on the whole of Europe as its home market.[2] The most important fact from our point of view is that *France needs immigrant labour* and as the Muslim Algerians are French citizens they have priority over aliens. Some economists have estimated that provided the economy expands metropolitan France can absorb, in time, eight million Muslim Algerians (i.e., almost the whole present Muslim Algerian population).

As already stated, there are about 500,000 coloured people resident in France today. The vast majority of these are North African. In

[1] Ministry of Labour, 18 August 1960, as reported in *Le Monde*.
[2] 'French Exports rise . . . ', W. Rees-Mogg, *Sunday Times*, 28 August 1960.

addition to about 400,000 Muslim Algerians, approximately 25,000 Moroccans and Tunisians are permanently in the country. There are in addition a few thousand French Somalis, Turks and other Muslims from the Middle East and North Africa. The non-North African coloured population is in the region of 100,000—125,000. It includes people of many races and colours, French citizens and aliens. There are many African students from the French Community, French West Indians, South Americans etc. Indo-Chinese, Laotians, Cambodians and other 'yellow people' are numerous. particularly in the Paris area. There appear to be many more 'yellow people' in France than in Britain.

Both the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of the Interior issue statistics from time to time on the numbers of Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants but they never tally. In September 1949 the Interior estimated that there were 14,019 Moroccans and 2,905 Tunisians in France, and in September 1953 11,352 and 2,164 respectively. In 1955 there were approximately 18,000 Moroccans and 3,000 Tunisians. Morocco and Tunisia are now completely independent of France and it is very unlikely that there are more than 20,000 Moroccans and 5,000 Tunisians in France today. These figures include the pre-war nucleus, soldiers liberated in France, workers brought over by the *Office National d'Immigration* and some clandestine entrants.

The distribution and occupational structure of the Moroccan and Tunisian workers are very similar to those of the Algerians, and since the Muslim Algerians constitute more than 90 per cent. of the total North African population in France the term 'Algerian' is often used to include all North Africans.

It is the Algerian immigration which has posed socio-political problems in France and which may well lead to racial troubles should the French economy experience a set-back. Politics apart, hitherto there has been no racial trouble in France and this happy state of affairs is probably due to both good economic conditions and the French mentality, their approach to colour and race.

The 400,000 Muslim Algerians in metropolitan France have been French citizens since 20 September 1947 and there is no restriction on their immigration from Algeria (which is legally a part of France) or on their movement in France itself. In this their position is similar to that of coloured British subjects. Their official freedom of entry and movement makes the collection of accurate statistics very difficult. However, French citizens are obliged to carry a National Identity Card and the Ministry of the Interior knows much about them. According to the Minister of the Interior, there were 194,843 Algerians in France in May 1949 and 234,807 in September 1953 (the latter figure included 4,851 women and 10,057 children). On 1 January 1954 there were about 250,000 and on 1 January 1955 about 300,000. Between 1947 and January 1954 about 750,000 Algerians arrived in France and 560,000 returned, leaving a net immigration of just under 200,000.

The period 1955–1958 witnessed a steep decline in Algerian immigration. In 1957, for example, 69,355 arrived and 54,768 left; a net immigration of 14,587. In 1958 (when there was a slight recession in the French economy) there was a net *emigration* from France of over 3,000. In September 1958 the Minister of the Interior stated that there were 322,000 Algerians in France (262,000 men, 15,000 women, 45,000 children under 14). In 1959 there was a net immigration of 21,812. During the period 1955–1959 the net immigration was approximately 58,000. On 1 January 1960 there were probably between 340,000 and 360,000 Algerians in France, and today there are about 400,000 (including approximately 50,000 children and 20,000 women). The monthly rates of arrivals and departures are very uneven; December is usually a slack month whereas the weeks immediately after *Ramadan* (a movable month) witness a great increase in Algerian immigration. Algerian immigration is largely seasonal.

Why have these Algerians come to live and work in France? Although some have surely been motivated by a sense of adventure or self-preservation (in view of the political situation) the fundamental reason is a great and growing *rural over-population* combined with a relative lack of industrialisation (and hence employment) in Algeria. The vast majority of the Algerians in France were peasants at home and they have come to seek industrial employment in the Mother Country.

Here one must distinguish between the Arabs and the Kabyles. The latter are an agricultural branch of the Berbers inhabiting the infertile highlands of Algeria. They speak a Berber dialect, but the main difference between an Arab and a Kabyle is cultural. Historically, the Berbers were of European origin (Vandals), unlike the Arabs. The term 'Muslim Algerian' conceals, therefore, significant differences of race, culture, language (to a limited extent), physical characteristics and colour. Some Algerians resemble Mediterranean Europeans and others approximate to the Negroid type. It may well be that these differences confuse the French-born whites and account in part for the relative lack of colour prejudice in France. Incidentally, it is thought that a very large number, perhaps a majority, of the Algerians in France come from the Kabylia in the *départements* of Constantine, Alger and Oran.

Be that as it may, we must remember that the Algerians are ethnically different from the French, come from a rural background, are Muslim and are nearly all illiterate (approximately 90 per cent. of the men and 98 per cent. of the women cannot write in either Arabic or French). Like the Indian, Pakistani, Arab and Somali workers in Britain they must adapt themselves to an industrial, Christian and European environment in order to survive.

That Algeria is over-populated can be seen from the following figures. The Muslim population increased from 3·3 million in 1886 to 7·6 million in 1948, and in 1959 was estimated to be 8,850,000 (excluding immigrants in France and the Saharan population). The Muslim

birth rate is between forty and forty-five per thousand per annum (it has dropped slightly since the beginning of the war) and the death rate between fifteen and twenty per thousand (the war has increased the rate: 150,000 Muslims have died in five years as a result of the war).[1]

The Muslim population has doubled itself since 1900 (the English population doubled itself from 1800–1850) but the vast majority have stayed in Algeria tilling the soil (the English, Irish etc., emigrated to the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Africa etc. in the nineteenth century. Further, British industrial expansion outstripped and absorbed the population increase). It is estimated that the Muslim Algerian population will have doubled itself again by the end of the century. Furthermore, it is a youthful population; approximately 50 per cent. are under 20, 45 per cent. adults and only 5 per cent. over working age. The reason for the very high birth rate is that the Muslims are polygamists, celibacy is very rare and early marriages the rule. Their low educational standard makes birth control almost impossible. Poverty and low economic expectations undoubtedly contribute to their proliferation.

The Muslim Algerians are therefore trying to cut the Gordian knot by migrating to industrialised areas. In Algeria itself the urban Muslim proletariat is increasing slowly, and in France the Algerian population has increased from approximately 50,000 (1947) to 400,000 (1960), i.e., by 800 per cent. Although over 90 per cent. of them come from rural areas not more than 2 per cent. are employed in agriculture in France. This drift to urban areas is not, of course, a specifically Algerian phenomenon. The migration of coloured peoples to the highly industrialised parts of the world should be regarded as a facet of twentieth century urbanisation. In principle, there is no difference between a Pakistani peasant migrating to Bradford and a Yorkshire yokel to London. In contrast it is worth pointing out that international migrations in the nineteenth century were mainly *from* industrialised parts of the world to virgin soils.

The Algerians have gone to France for precisely the same reasons as West Indians, Indians, Pakistanis and others have emigrated to Britain. The 'push' of over-population, particularly rural, high rates of unemployment and under-employment have played a part, but the 'pull' of high industrial wages, family allowances (particularly in France), social security benefits and better educational opportunities have played a much larger one.

The vast majority of the Muslim Algerians who both drift to the large towns in Algeria and who come over to France are landless, unemployed peasants. Undernourished, ill-clothed and illiterate, many have become bitter proletarians, and it would not be surprising if many of them, both in France and in Algeria, have Communist sympathies.

The distribution of Algerians in France is closely related to their

[1] *Le Monde*, 4 August 1960.

employment possibilities; they follow the jobs. They are to be found in every *département*, but especially in the industrialised areas. According to the Ministries of Labour and the Interior, in 1954 approximately 33 per cent. of the Algerian immigrants lived in the Seine area (Greater Paris), 30 per cent. in the Nord, Moselle, Rhône and Bouches-du-Rhône areas, 13 per cent. in the Seine-et-Oise, Pas-de-Calais, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Loire areas, 15 per cent. in eighteen *départements* impinging on the above-mentioned *départements* and 9 per cent. in the remaining 63 *départements*. At present, it is felt that the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Nord, Moselle and Rhone areas have witnessed an increase in Algerian immigrants, whereas in some of the mining areas their numbers have probably decreased owing to the reorganisation and modernisation of the mining industry.

Approximately 75 per cent. of the Algerians live in the above-named 9 *départements* and five of them contain about 63 per cent. of the total population:

Seine (Paris area)	33%
Nord (Lille, Roubaix areas)	10%
Moselle (Metz area)	8%
Rhône (Lyon area)	6%
Bouches-du-Rhône (Marseille area)	6%

More than 80 per cent. of the immigrants arrive in (and depart from) Marseille and then make their way up to Lyon, Paris, the North and the East. The ports of Rouen, le Havre and Bordeaux have a few thousand Algerians and other coloured people (the latter are mainly seamen).

The distribution of the Algerian women and children in France is very similar to that of the men, as would be expected. About 33 per cent. are in the Seine area and the same proportion in the Nord, Moselle, Rhône and Bouches-du-Rhône areas.

Although there are many more Algerian women in France today than in 1950, the vast majority of the Algerian men have no family life to speak of.

In May 1952 the Ministry of Public Health and Population estimated that there were about the same number of Muslim-European families (legitimate) as Muslim families (legitimate), and the number of liaisons was about 33 per cent. of the total number of families (Muslim and Muslim-European). It is impossible to say whether these percentages are accurate today.

Some social workers believe that one in two of the white girls willing to marry or live with Muslim Algerians in France is French-born. There is a fairly large number of single white alien girls living in France, and from a social point of view they find themselves in circumstances somewhat similar to those of Algerians.

The housing conditions of the Algerian immigrants are rather poor. One room per family is very common and often two families share a room. The hygienic and cooking facilities available to the Algerians are poor by any standard. The housing shortage in France, and particularly in Paris, is very acute in spite of the fact that 278,000

houses and flats have been built in the Seine area since the Liberation. At present, 75,000 units are in the process of construction. It should, however, be pointed out that the housing conditions of the French-born and white immigrant lower-income groups are also poor. The principal complaint of those French-born who would like to see Algerian and alien immigration restricted is that the housing conditions are bad enough without 'foreigners' coming to make it worse.

Algerian immigrants from the same villages and even regions in Algeria tend to live in the same areas and streets in France. They usually inhabit the cheaper areas, in which alien (mainly European) immigrant workers also live.

In Britain, a young West Indian once told a sociologist: 'Looking for rooms is a very dismal business. You waste time and money, and swallow insults as well.'[1] Much more research seems to have been done in this field, however, in Britain than in France. It is difficult to say whether Algerian workers have more 'landlady trouble' than their British counterparts, although there is little doubt that they do find it hard to secure decent accommodation at a reasonable rent. This may be due partly to the fact that being unskilled labourers in the main their 'purchasing power' is very low, and although money talks throughout the world it tends to talk rather loudly in France. Some landladies adopt a policy of deliberate discrimination against 'North Africans'. This discrimination is not entirely or even necessarily racial, though the racial factor has crossed the minds of some of them. The political factor is very important; what with F.L.N. assassinations and M.N.A. reprisals (and vice-versa), followed by police investigations, one has to be a brave person to talk to Algerians (or even about them) in public let alone offer them hospitality. Again, right-wing landladies feel that it would be 'unpatriotic' to let a room to the 'enemy'. Coloured students are sometimes discriminated against, as recent correspondence in *Le Monde* indicated.[2] A Tunisian student is reported to have said that a number of French families refused to house him as soon as they learned that he was North African, although he had been sent by the Paris University Lodgings Bureau. It would, however, be rash to maintain that these families, or French families generally, are racially prejudiced. Some of them are, but many, perhaps the majority, are simply physically afraid of North Africans. It is alleged, for example, that Algerians tend to resort to violence on the slightest provocation, and some French newspapers tend to highlight North African misdemeanours. Although accurate statistics on the non-political crime rates of Algerians in France are not available, responsible people feel that Algerians are no more crime-prone than their white hosts when allowances are made for their poor housing conditions and lack of stable family life.

Some doctors believe that Algerians have a rather high incidence rate of tuberculosis, but they point out that many of them pick up T.B. in France. Evidence is patchy and difficult to obtain, though the

[1] A. T. Carey, *Colonial Students* (London, Secker & Warburg, 1956).
[2] *Le Monde*, 10 September 1960.

medical views expressed tend to confirm British experience of Indian and Pakistani immigrants.

The vast majority of the Algerians in France are unskilled labourers although there are probably more semi-skilled and skilled Algerians in France than in Algeria. Since 1947 about 15,000 Algerians have been absorbed into industry per annum, and at present there are about 250,000 in stable employment. This figure does not include those who work part-time or irregularly, either out of choice or circumstances. According to the Ministry of Labour, in 1948, 75 per cent. of the North Africans (mainly Algerians) resident in France were in employment; in 1949, 72 per cent.; in 1950, 65 per cent.; in 1951, 59 per cent.; in 1952, 62 per cent.; in 1953, 57 per cent.; in 1954, 55 per cent. Today about 60 per cent. are in stable employment. The percentage decrease since 1948 is due mainly to the great increase in the number of women and children (only a handful of the women are in employment), old people, unemployables and the afflicted.

Since 1947 the influx of Algerians has corresponded closely to the fluctuations of the economy, and some economists judge the state of the French economy by the number of unemployed Algerians. The higher the Algerian unemployment rate the more stagnant the economy; when the economy is buoyant Algerian immigration and the number in employment increases. As a general rule this is probably true, but political factors must not be discounted. On the whole, however, British experience tends to confirm the French view; when the economic climate is chilly the coloured unemployment rate increases at a much faster rate than the white, and coloured immigration tends to fall off. The recession of 1957–1958 in Britain, for example, witnessed a decrease in West Indian immigration.

The French Ministry of Labour has ruled that work must first be offered to unemployed French citizens (i.e., mainly Algerians) before alien labour is imported. It is, however, alleged that Algerians are not capable of filling certain vacancies and aliens are employed instead. Nevertheless, most of the large firms in the Paris area are believed to employ more Algerians than aliens.

The Algerians are employed in all the *départements* of France, but the tendency to concentrate in certain *départments* has increased. Since 1948 they have tended to favour the Est, Nord, Seine, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-Maritime, Rhône and Alpes-Maritimes areas. The fluctuation of the number of Algerians in any one area is linked solely to its job possibilities. When jobs are scarce in, say, Marseille they go to, say, Lyon and so on. New arrivals go directly to those areas where there is work. Their mobility is very high and helps to reduce the rigidity of the supply of labour, In this respect, as in so many others, the Algerian workers in France can be compared with coloured workers in Britain, particularly Indians and Pakistanis.

Although over 90 per cent. of the Algerians were peasants in Algeria only about 2 per cent. work in agriculture in France. Some own, or are employed in, cafés etc., but very few are in the tertiary industries.

Some are pedlars, reminding one of their Indian confrères in Britain. The majority work in the coal and lignite mines, the metal industries, the electrical and mechanical industries and, above all, in the building trades. Compared with the earlier period of immigration (1945-1950) the post-1954 period has witnessed a decline in the numbers employed in the mines and metal production, and an increase in the mechanical and electrical industries and in the building trades. At present, it is estimated that over 30 per cent. of Algerian workers are in constructional work (including hydro-electric projects). But for this expansion in the building trades, the number of unemployed Algerians would have reached alarming proportions. In some *départements* over 70 per cent. of the Algerian workers are employed on constructional work. The textile and chemical industries appear to employ more Algerians to-day than in the period 1945–1954. Very few are employed in transport and hardly any are in domestic work. Not more than 0·2 per cent. are employed in offices or in really responsible factory posts.

The Algerians do the most tiring, dirtiest and worst-paid jobs which the French-born do not want (cf. coloured workers in Britain). Their lack of professional qualifications is the reason advanced for this state of affairs. According to the Ministry of Labour, in December 1952, 71 per cent. of the Algerians in employment were unskilled; in December 1953, 70 per cent.; in September 1954, 74 per cent. The proportion of unskilled is probably as high, if not higher, today.

Although many Algerian workers resent their rôle in the French economy, there is little doubt that they are glad to find employment in France. Hundreds of millions of New French Francs are transferred to Algeria every year by the Algerian workers in France (family allowances form over 20 per cent. of the total). The Algerians, like the coloured workers in Britain, have obviously come to work and work hard. They have manifestly not come to draw unemployment benefit and to have a pampered time on the Welfare State. Indeed, a very high percentage (at least 20 per cent.) of the Muslims in Algeria actually live on the money sent home by the Algerian workers in France.

The Algerian workers come into contact with their white hosts almost exclusively during working hours. Some of them meet French people after work, and then mainly in dance-halls and cafés. To a lesser extent, this is true of the students too. So far as dance-halls are concerned, one has not heard of Algerians being turned away on account of their racial origin. There is no doubt in the writer's mind that the French indulge in much less pin-pricking than the British, in matters of race and colour. For a café, restaurant or hotel proprietor to turn away a coloured person is almost unheard of in France. Indeed, one feels that at bottom the French, unlike the British and the Americans, think more in terms of *culture* than colour. Much greater emphasis is laid on education in France than in Britain, vis-à-vis both coloured people and themselves.

The vast majority of the Algerians frequent cafés owned and manned by their compatriots, partly in order to recreate the *ambience* they are

used to, and partly because they feel that they are 'not wanted' by their white hosts. Generally speaking, Algerians complain that the French, though they may not be overtly hostile, think badly of them, and do not trust them.

Many Algerian workers in France have a 'chip on the shoulder', but here one should distinguish between the migrants and the immigrants, between those who have come for a time to make enough money to be able to return home and those who have come to stay. So far as the Algerian workers in France are concerned, only a handful are fully-fledged immigrants. On the whole, these immigrants have a very small chip on the shoulder, if at all. They resolved at some point to throw in their lot with France, Why, how and at what stage in their relations with the French they made this decision it is impossible to say. Perhaps the wife is French, the job interesting, the financial situation sound. The children may be happy in France, the flat comfortable, the neighbours friendly. Again, it may well be that their psychological make-up predisposes them to seek the friendship of the French. Nevertheless, a number of 'integrated' Algerians feel that the metropolitan French 'put up with rather than accept them'. An Algerian immigrant, a minor civil servant in Paris, wrote thus to *Le Monde:* 'It would be unjust to say that all Frenchmen are racially prejudiced. Certain French families have received me as if I were one of them. But in the crowd I feel that I am not wanted. Generally racial prejudice is not apparent. . . . but I feel alone, even in the most animated streets, . . . when I notice the looks I receive from passers-by . . . It seems to me that one of the causes of racial prejudice is the way in which certain newspapers highlight North African violence . . . French readers of certain newspapers are set against the Algerian.'[1]

Whether this view is common among the Algerian immigrants, it is difficult to say. There is no doubt that some of them are extremely glad to be in France, and are pro-French.

The migrants, the vast majority of the Algerians, are glad to find employment in France. Generally speaking, however, they appear to resent both the rôle they play in the French economy and what they interpret as the condescending attitude of their work-mates. Some of them believe that they are exploited at work, discriminated against when they look for accommodation, looked down on socially, regarded as vagabonds and murderers, and generally felt to be 'inferior'.
Let them speak for themselves:

'They think that we are illiterate, cultureless, unsophisticated peasants . . . cannon-fodder in war-time, cheap labour in peace-time.'

'They are always saying that we are French citizens . . . but they don't respect us . . . '

'When I grumble at work my mates say . . . "If you don't like it here clear off" . . . '

'The French are not racially prejudiced. They are very class-conscious

[1] *Le Monde*, 10 September 1960.

. . . French girls don't like to go out with us because their friends say we (Algerians) are low-class . . . '

'The French people are all right. It's the newspapers that cause the trouble . . . '

'They think we are stupid because uneducated . . . '

'They have no respect for us, never had and never will . . . '

'They think that all of us are murderers . . . and generally unreliable . . . '

'They don't speak our language . . . they don't bother to understand our way of life . . . they are shocked to learn that some of us have *wives*, and are scandalised to hear that we have left them *all* at home . . . they think we have come to have a gay time in Pigalle . . . '

On the other hand, some Algerian migrants feel that the French people are decent and warm-hearted. Some of them are sympathetically disposed towards the French working-classes, but have an obsessive hatred of their employers and the police.

On the whole, one feels that the more intelligent migrants are more bitter than their phlegmatic compatriots who tend to adopt a philosophical attitude ('Some Frenchmen are good, some aren't').

Inevitably, many would believe that the views of the embittered 'ring true', that the French are a prejudiced people. Personally I feel that to conclude thus would be both wrong and unjust. The domestic French record in matters of race and colour is, I suggest, better than the British; compared with that of the United States it is excellent. As a female American Negro, resident in Paris, put it: 'France is a wonderful country, the French a civilised people . . . no Frenchman has ever reminded me that I am black . . . I dread going back to the States.'

One major issue remains: the French attitude to Algerian immigration which has to be distinguished from their attitude to colour and race.

This is unfavourable and reminds one of the British attitude to 'foreigners'. In France much more attention is paid to the war than to the implications of unrestricted Algerian immigration. Hitherto, so far as one is aware there has been no *racial* trouble (as opposed to political tension) between the Algerians and their hosts. In part, this has been due to good economic conditions; but in the event of a depression it is very unlikely that the presence of a vast reservoir of Algerian unskilled labour will pass unnoticed. There may well be serious racial troubles in France should the national economy experience a setback. In that event the French working classes would be the first to protest against the presence of the Algerians. In Britain it appears that the lower income groups have already perceived the implications of coloured immigration. The presence of coloured people in France and Britain needs a high level of employment in order to safeguard the fair name of the West. In a very real sense they have added another dimension to domestic economic policies in both these countries.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE UNIFICATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1902-1910

By L. M. THOMPSON

London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 550 pp. 50s.

A solid history of the unification—if the word may be permitted—of South Africa is overdue, and yet timely. South Africa has never been long out of the news. Perhaps in the year 1960, when the republican issue adds to the torrent of troubles which afflict every part of the continent, more general readers will be attracted to this book than in quieter times. It is a serious documented political treatise, not meant for light reading. Why was the South African community so dis-united? What were the lines of cleavage? What aspirations stirred the hearts of the South Africans fifty and sixty years ago? What baser notions of unenlightened self-interest misdirected their steps?

In answering these questions Professor Thompson keeps the temperature low; he uses no superlatives, denounces no villains; but he has his favourites and they will not be to everyone's choice. Botha, the beloved hero of the Liberal Imperialists, does not shape so well in this version of history as in most others; and a large place is taken by Merriman, the Cape Colony liberal who was so devoted to British parliamentary traditions and so endlessly suspicious of something called 'imperialism'. What is lacking in this analysis is any clear conception of who the 'imperialists' were, and what they were trying to do. If ever anyone, Milner was an imperialist; his schemes were coldly supported by the conservatives and very brusquely repudiated by the liberals as soon as they came into power; but Merriman with many good South Africans, and I cannot altogether exclude Professor Thompson from sympathy with them, adhered to the belief that somewhere in the heart of the British establishment was a secret junta striving against the transfer of power. The imperialist influence, if at all, was exercised through Milner's kindergarten, whose work is examined but not emphasised in this history. They were the conscious imitators of the men who had already made the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, about which the real South Africans were very ill-informed. This general ignorance of the emerging Commonwealth is well brought out in this book. The author's final word, that the South Africans would have been wise to copy the constitution of the U.S.A. rather than that of Britain, is an extraordinary comment to make, in the year 1960! Surely they would have done better to study the constitution of Canada.

The true lesson of this episode, however, points another way, towards topics more apposite to students of race relations. No one in 1909 appreciated the racial problem. The Cape liberals were content if they could retain their very limited franchise for 'civilised' men; the Transvaalers, whether Dutch or English-speaking (Afrikaans was not yet recognised as a language) were as firm then as now for white supremacy; the British in Natal were the most illiberal of all. As for the British Government, it was not imperialist enough. Some gestures of optimism, and a device for entrenching the Cape franchise, took the Liberals as far as they would go. An amendment of the Act of Union to permit non-white representation in the Senate mustered only 57 votes in the House of Commons. Generosity to the Boers was the overriding consideration and the native problem was consigned to the future.

C. E. CARRINGTON

SOUTH AFRICA: TWO VIEWS OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT

By S. PIENAAR and ANTHONY SAMPSON

London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1960. 81 pp. 5s.

This booklet consists of two essays on *apartheid*, the one by an Afrikaner Nationalist, the other by a member of the staff of *The Observer*. Mr. Pienaar adds little to the familiar Nationalist case: the appeal *ad misericordiam* to the effect that 'the Afrikaner has nowhere else to go'; and the consequent obligatory division of the Union of South Africa into black and white 'homelands'. There is no mention of the Coloureds, although current rumour has it that Dr. Verwoerd intends to groom them for stardom as auxiliary Afrikaners, so impressed was he by their lack of solidarity with the Bantu who demonstrated in Cape Town after Sharpeville last March. Mr. Pienaar's essay is entitled 'Safeguarding the Nations of South Africa'. The Asians, who number more than a third of a million and lost their political rights in the Cape in 1956, are not mentioned either. Evidently they are not a 'South African nation'. The Group Areas Act condemns them, in fact, to economic annihilation.

Mr. Sampson, who had not seen Mr. Pienaar's contribution, has little difficulty in showing that the plan for Bantustans is unworkable: because they constitute only one-thirteenth of the Union's area, because the £104 million considered necessary by Dr. Tomlinson for their development is not available, because the Bantu Authorities are just Government nominees, because *apartheid* is utterly unacceptable to the African political organisations and because the idea of a specifically Bantu civilisation at this time of day is absurd anyway. Mr. Sampson's criticisms of Dr. Eiselen, one of the Nationalist spokesmen on racial affairs, therefore constitute a rather empty *dialogue de sourds*.

Mr. Sampson writes at some length about Bantu politicians who, in Chief Luthuli's words, have been 'knocking in vain, patiently, moderately and modestly, at a closed and barred door'. He tells the reader nothing about those white liberals who have opened their doors to them, nor of the opposition to *apartheid* by an Afrikaner *élite*, first among intellectuals (Malherbe, Marquard, Pistorius, van der Post), now in politics from Steytler and Basson. Thus the booklet merely registers an impasse without indicating policies which might avert disaster. Such policies have been expounded in 1960, for instance, in Dr. Cowan's proposals for a new South African constitution and in the multi-racial symposium *South Africa: the Road Ahead*, published in Cape Town.

CHARLES JANSON

RACE AND POLITICS: PARTNERSHIP IN THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND

By EDWARD CLEGG

London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 280 pp. 30s.

Mr. Edward Clegg is neither a professional historian nor a student of sociology. He is a soil scientist who, by purest chance, was posted to Northern Rhodesia as a member of the Colonial Research Service. Here he acquired a thorough knowledge of Central Africa's physical environment and ecological problems, the kind of intellectual equipment which chair-borne historians usually lack. At the same time he got to know the different peoples of the Federation, staying with Europeans on their farms, meeting middle-class Africans, and supervising black labourers in the field to get an efficient day's work out of them. The present work is based on these experiences, as well as on a good deal of subsequent research. The result of Mr. Clegg's labours is a survey of Central African problems, distinguished alike for its knowledge, clarity and insight.

The title of the book is admittedly somewhat misleading, for the author concentrates on Northern Rhodesia rather than on the Federation as a whole. But within these terms of reference, he has produced an excellent historical account which embodies a vast amount of material, ranging from debates in the Northern Rhodesian *Hansard* to studies into the food habits of the Bemba. His work also possesses two additional virtues. It is free from that silly and pretentious jargon that disfigures so much of modern literature on social problems, and it is short enough to be read by non-specialists.

The writer's general approach to history is marked by the 'two D.s' of detachment and determinism. There are no villains in this work, and readers will look in vain for those stock characters of current journalism on Africa, the 'immature native agitator' on the one hand, and the 'reactionary white settler' on the other. Events in Central Africa appear as a Sophoclean tragedy moving on inexorably to its grim conclusion, the end of 'partnership', the break-up of the Federation, and a final struggle for power. The Zambezi will become a continental Mason-Dixon line; the black states to the north will clash with the whites in the south, who will rally to defend their way of life and the existence of European society in its last African bastion.

There is much in the present situation to justify Mr. Clegg's gloomy predictions. Blacks and whites have little in common; and the emergence of an African middle class, so much desired by the advocates of 'partnership', may itself accelerate the final clash. But there are also other factors which may yet modify the situation. White settlement is itself not yet exhausted as a historical force, and immigration from outside may continue to affect the local balance of power. Industrialisation, whilst creating new tensions, may also act as a kind of social cement, giving to both races enough of an economic stake to maintain an uneasy but non-violent form of co-existence. African opposition is far from united, and may yet become further divided on the labour front. Such a development seems likely, for the wide wage gap, which at present separates white from black labour, is in process of being reproduced within the black labour force. The newly emergent African bourgeoisie may not be as willing to force a showdown as many assume, not just for military reasons, but also from fear of even a temporary state of anarchy *à la Congolaise*, which would wipe out all present gains and jeopardise its future.

Finally there is the long-term possibility that pro-Africanism, which now characterises 'progressive' thinking overseas to the detriment of the European position in Africa, may in turn lose some of its present vigour. Such a development again is not inconceivable. The romantic philhellenism and *Polenschwärmerei*, characteristic of the earlier part of the

nineteenth century, did not last. Latin America similarly ceased to be an intellectually acceptable cause, once the Spaniards had been expelled. British enthusiasm for Bolivar and his comrades in arms gave way to a contemptuous disillusionment with all things South American that was as unmerited as the original enthusiasm; and present-day commitments to the cause of Ghana, Guinea and Upper Volta may prove to be just as fleeting.

But all these considerations are in the realm of the intangible, and they can in no wise detract from the merits of this most valuable and scholarly survey.

L. H. GANN

A NEW DEAL IN CENTRAL AFRICA

By COLIN LEYS and CRANFORD PRATT

London, Heinemann, 1960. 212 pp. 21s.

This is rather a cold book. Its virtue lies in a penetrating relentless spirit that roves over the politics and economics of Central Africa.

Its authors, drawn from university and work in the field, have collectively spent a lifetime in Central Africa. They share a common dislike for the system which is barely concealed in their analysis of the advantages and benefits of Federation. The arguments against are all well presented and in some cases well supported, but perhaps a little more humanity would have led the authors to less rigid conclusions.

The story of the creation of European exclusiveness in politics—following Mr. Leys' own study of European politics in Southern Rhodesia—is retold. This is a vital part of any appreciation of the motives of the Federal Government. The pattern of trade preferences, the inter-territorial tax redistribution following Federation, and the location of industry are rigorously challenged. But the reader, perhaps with the hindsight of the events of the summer in Rhodesia, wonders whether there is not now more flexibility in the political situation than hitherto. This does not invalidate Leys' and Pratt's analysis, for much of the change has been achieved by an appeal to the head and not the heart.

In economics, a layman accepting much of Professor Barker's thesis could claim that the key issue is the level of African urban employment in Southern Rhodesia. Certainly the expansion of industrial vacancies means tariff walls and concentration of industry. To an intelligent African government in Nyasaland it should be more important that there should be such vacancies in Southern Rhodesia than not at all—and the choice is almost as stark.

A New Deal in Central Africa should primarily be welcomed for its insistence—whatever doubt may be cast on the detailed proposals—that a truce, and then a reconciliation between the races, must be achieved in Central Africa. The days are gone when the process of 'whitening' a few Africans would have led to a solution of the political problem. Both races, retaining their social identity, must create political confidence in each other.

JAMES LEMKIN

KENYA: THE TENSIONS OF PROGRESS

By SUSAN WOOD

London, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1960. 108 pp. 6s.

Liberal opinion in Britain looks on African nationalism as a great progressive, unifying and liberating force. A favourite catchword is that all Europeans 'come to terms' with it; coming to terms is double-talk for surrender. Anyone who does not accept this is a right-wing reactionary and his attitude is nearly always described as fanatical or intransigent. But when the attitude of African nationalists appears to partake of these qualities, it is an understandable response to the purblind and aggressive racial attitude of the Europeans.

So firmly has this marriage between British liberalism and African nationalism been consummated that no one has paused to reflect what an odd match it is. Nationalism as a political force is much the same whether it erupts in Europe, Asia, Africa or anywhere else. Throughout history it has generally expressed itself as one of the most destructive, reactionary and illiberal causes known to man, resulting since the days of Herod and before in innumerable wars, persecutions and atrocities. Mr. Gladstone was on the side of the Armenians, who were victims of nationalism, not of the Turks, who expressed it; and English liberals generally avow more sympathy with the five or six million Jewish victims of the concentration camps than with the German nationalists who sent them there. The fact is, of course, that nationalism is simply the first and often most fanatical and brutal stage of imperialism, which is an extension, and often an attenuation, of the nationalist urge.

It may be realistic to say that we must come to terms, i.e. surrender, to the force which has generated such manifestations of human ruthlessness, but it is odd to find liberals preaching this necessity as a duty, while priding themselves on their belief in human goodness. Of course it is true that we cannot resist a typhoon; we must surrender to it.

But most of us would do so sadly rather than gleefully. Only liberals seem able to greet the hurricane with shining eyes as a great progressive force which those about to be drowned, battered or, at best, ruined, should hail with a Butlin-Camp sort of good fellowship, while crusty, bone-headed, Brontosaurian old reactionaries, intransigent and fanatical to the end, fuss about getting in supplies, shoring up anything that looks shorable and trying to keep out of the way of crashing trees.

Mrs. Susan Wood is an active, well-known and respected Kenya liberal, and a founder-member of the Capricorn Africa Society. Her summary of the political situation there naturally makes no secret of its bias, and she says much that is timely and true. The labyrinth of Kenya politics has never been more confusing, and readers will find her a helpful Ariadne. Two charts, showing the state of the Legislative Council before and after the Lancaster House Conference held last January, illustrate just how complex matters have become, what with constituency elected members, specially elected members, nominated members, common roll members, national members and ex-officio members, not to mention communal primary elections, elections by electoral colleges of elected members, multiple votes and all the rest. As for the parties, Mrs. Wood's chart shows six, one of which appears to consist solely of Air-Commodore Howard Williams. Readers might be excused for failing to see the Wood for the trees.

Like a kaleidoscope on a switchback railway, the scene is changing so swiftly that since the booklet went to press a wholesale re-grouping has split the Africans into two major and opposing parties, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, the latter a coalition of three or four minor parties based mainly on hostility to the Kikuyu and Luo tribes who support KANU. To keep in the present Gilbertian swim, *both* parties have adopted the still-detained Jomo Kenyatta as their chairman. Also, in the last month or two a new and mainly European party has been launched, and named the Kenya Coalition. The chart of the parties was therefore out of date before it was printed, but will nevertheless serve as a useful key to recent developments.

Mrs. Wood's main purpose would appear to be to persuade local Europeans of the urgent need to understand and co-operate with Kenya's African nationalists. This is the only way to encourage moderates at the expense of extremists. Mr. Julius Nyerere is of course the shining example of a successful yet moderate and sensible nationalist. If all leaders were like him, and could operate in conditions like those of Tanganyika, the African picture would be different indeed. Mrs. Wood naturally extols Mr. Nyerere and his European followers such as Sir Ernest Vasey and Mr. Derek Bryceson, also a Capricornian, and hopes that 'European leadership in Kenya can learn from Bryceson's solidarity *behind* Nyerere . . . to express itself through African leaders and policies, and identify itself with the struggle for the achievement of nationhood. If not, European leadership may well find no place and few adherents in contemporary Africa.'

True as this is, and in Tanganyika feasible, it is hard to see how European leadership can express itself through such African leaders as Mr. Tom Mboya, who repeatedly states that all European land belongs to Africans and must be restored to them forthwith without compensation, goes out of his way to insult and frighten the whites (as well as people like the Masai), and expresses in other phrases his famous injunction made at Accra to 'scram out of Africa'. Mrs. Wood makes no suggestion as to what can be done if one side appears to entertain no wish to co-operate, and she is inclined to skate too lightly over the thin ice of tribalism, a far greater threat to nationalist ambitions than any amount of now quite ineffective European 'intransigence' and 'fanaticism'.

Africa, as Mrs. Wood says, is experiencing three major revolutions at the same time. 'The modern African has to contend with a problem of adaptation to his environment more severe than has probably ever before confronted any human being.' No wonder so many buckle under. Future historians, she thinks, may well decide that the West's greatest gift to Africa is not material gain but the stimuli and frustrations that have awoken the peoples from an age-old apathy. For those Europeans who do not scram, but are willing to exchange privilege for comradeship, there will be 'the exacting, exasperating but exhilarating task of strengthening the foothold of civilisation'.

The speed of events which confounds not only constitution-makers but, in their humbler sphere, the chroniclers, is no doubt responsible for a number of minor slips. Land was reserved to Europeans in the so-called white highlands not by clauses in the leasehold titles but by administrative means, enforced through the Highlands Board and endorsed by several public utterances by Secretaries of State: this is why 'extreme right-wing' Europeans have indulged in 'noisy protest' about the violation of pledges. It is incorrect to describe the 12,746 square miles of European-owned land (the actual figure is 11,724 sq. m.) as 'cultivable'; less than half of it falls into this category. It is unfortunately far from true that unemployment is confined to the Kikuyu and does not affect the Luo. A much more serious criticism is that, except for passing references, Mrs. Wood virtually ignores the economic aspects, concentrating on politics. On the basic question of how an economy based almost wholly on non-African enterprise can be maintained, and indeed strengthened, under an African government whose leaders appear at present antagonistic to most non-African endeavour, she is silent. Yet unless this can be solved, 'uhuru' will prove a hollow mockery to all Kenya's Africans except the handful at the top able to collar the shreds of the country's once expanding revenues.

ELSPETH HUXLEY

NEW NIGERIANS

By MORA DICKSON

London, Dobson, 1960. 256 pp. 25s.

This is a humorous, deadly serious, talented book, having closer links with the heroic world of Mary Slessor or Mary Kingsley than with the slickness of our own day. About half is given to an impressionist account of five years at the 'Outward Bound' school founded at Man o'War Bay in the Cameroons by the author's husband, Alec Dickson, in the early fifties, under the patronage of E. R. Chadwick, the creator of the Udi experiment. Five 'character' sketches and an account of journeys in Nigeria, mainly to study after-effects, form a kind of appendix. Mrs. Dickson's many lovely linocuts that adorn the text capture the Nigerian scene with remarkable fidelity.

Inevitably, there must be two opinions about the imposition of harsh 'character-forming' series of tests upon *ad hoc* courses of young Nigerians, policemen, teachers, miners, politicians, students, railwaymen, clerks, many of whom had to be badgered into ascending the mists of Mount Cameroon, or plunging into the South Atlantic rollers; or shocked into action by faked accidents, fires, smugglers; or forced through the forest on a blindfold trail. My own opinion is that it was justified, along with the 'shared fun', the evening stories, the songs, the (abortive) weaving classes, the visits to leper camps. It was certainly something entirely alien to the easy-going West African temperament. Perhaps it is a pity from the general point of view that Mrs. Dickson, explicitly, does not give the full picture, apart from a scarifying account of the official reaction—or inaction—to the crash of a French airliner on the slopes of the mountain. After all, the book starts with a quotation from Abraham Lincoln: 'He has the right to criticise who has the heart to help.' She only hints at 'struggles and tensions . . . bitterness and schisms', and disappointment at the apparent lack of lasting after-effect. But, all in all, whether the reader dismisses the whole account as latter-day 'imperialism', or responds to the high seriousness and humour of the Dicksons, this is undoubtedly a book to be read and pondered by all those interested in new forms of contact between the peoples of Europe and those until recently under their tutelage.

HENRY SWANZY

THE CHURCH TO AFRICA. PASTORAL LETTERS OF THE AFRICAN HIERARCHIES

London, published for the Africa Office by the Sword of the Spirit, 1960. 136 pp. 7s. 6d.

This is a collection of eleven of the most significant letters written by any Roman Catholic Bishops during the last decade. Taken as a whole they help to define the attitude of the Church to the two great issues of contemporary African national independence and race relations—in so far as these issues affect Faith and Morals. Here is the thorough condemnation of the 'evil and anti-Christian character' of apartheid; here are vivid, urgent applications of the Church's teaching on education, family life and political responsi- in the African environment. The relationship between Church and State may well become in the immediate future one of the crucial problems in Africa; this is therefore a most timely publication, of vital importance to Catholics in Africa and of use and value to many people outside the Church.

RICHARD GRAY

AFRICAN NATIONALISM

By NDABANINGI SITHOLE

London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 174 pp. 12s. 6d.

It is an unpleasant reflection on European society in Africa that a book like *African Nationalism* needs to be written. It is no credit to us. This is not simply because it criticises European mental attitudes and behaviour in a plural society but because it shows how fair a chance the Europeans once had of leadership—of 'senior partnership'—almost, according to Mr. Sithole, of semi-divinity—in Central Africa. And the chance is almost lost. Mr. Sithole laments the failure of Europeans to share their political control with non-Europeans, and, in a nice mathematical way, shows how his countrymen mock the European argument that what is needed is time, and that the Africans should be patient:

> 'There was a time when the white man used to argue thus: it has taken the white man two thousand years to arrive at his present stage of Western civilisation, and the African . . . has no right to clamour for full admission . . . until he also has done his stint. The African used to accept this . . . but suddenly it dawned on his consciousness that . . . when he finished his term of apprenticeship the white man would still say to the African: "It took the white man 4,000 years to be where he is".'

I confess that I found parts of Mr. Sithole's book tedious. There is too much juggling with words to show that Africans have their own understanding of virtues—freedom, gratitude, justice—that some European writers deny them, although I suppose it may be necessary in Central Africa still to point the moral many times, that Africans have a past worthy of respect, in the present a legitimate demand for political rights and a future—with the European minorities—full of hope, if the latter will only accept the first two premises. It was unnecessary in particular to take so much trouble to answer so silly a book as Stuart Cloete's *African Giant*.

The part *I enjoyed* most, of course, was the excellent short autobiographical introduction: the picture of Ndabaningi Sithole as the child of a 'handsome father' who admired the 'striking beauty of an intelligent country girl'; of his birth in July 1920 in a 'low mud-and-pole hut with a dirt floor for a maternity clinic, bits of old skin for my mattress, a reed-mat for my bed, a goat's skin for my blanket, and a folded buck-skin for my pillow'; of how he was hungry as a small boy herding the cattle with the 'bullyism, cruelty and garden raiding' that went on; of the mission school, the 'kitchen-boy' apprenticeship with a European family; then the success story starting with Garfield Todd's Dadaya mission, of his becoming a devout Christian, attending training college, being a lay preacher when he realised 'how gospel-starved the people were in the rural areas'; and finally—in the autobiography so far—of how Mr. Sithole did his 'secondary education and [his] Bachelor of Arts Degree entirely by private study and correspondence'. It reads a little like a plot by George Eliot—even an illustration for Samuel Smiles—but it is a story that could be paralleled in many other parts of Africa.

Another impression, too, is given, that to people like Ndabaningi Sithole Africa is no longer isolated from the world, nor one part of the continent from another. He has been influenced by Nasser, Gandhi, Nkrumah, by European history, by what was obviously a sharp electric appetite for knowledge; and, as in other parts of the continent, the great catalyst of change in him, and in what he saw around him, was the Second World War: 'the whole atmosphere became laden with the spirit of independence, and as it is the nature of the air to circulate, it soon reached Africa, and from Cape to Cairo the African peoples are breathing in this wonderful breeze of independence'; a romantic hope twenty years ago, a possibility ten years ago, and now a fact. We—we Europeans—must learn to accept it. Mr. Sithole likes to quote from *The Tempest* to show how, in the end, Caliban saw through the god-myth that he mistakenly built round the drunken Stephano and Trinculo. He might well have quoted a different passage:

'You taught me language; and my profit on't
Is, I know how to curse!'

The surprising thing is how little Mr. Sithole curses us for, and how mild a brand—as yet—his African nationalism is.

DENNIS AUSTIN

NATIONALISM

By ELIE KEDOURIE

London, Hutchinson, 1960. 144 pp. 21s.

This is a book for the professional philosopher. The author traces the ideas, mainly in Kant and Fichte, which recast the European notion of individual freedom, of the 'nation', and of the relation between the two; it is interesting to see how the quite valid observation that the individual is in some senses only meaningful as part of a society can slip into a deification of society at his expense. In the closing sections there are some observations on the actual quality of some modern nationalist movements.

As a book—and particularly with such a broad title—the result is not satisfactory. Even if the reader mentally fills in the missing sociological and economic factors, and particularly the growth of literacy and communication which have spread political activity among such frightening multitudes of mankind, there is still the question of weight and priority between the various factors which produce a social result. How much did Kant matter, what put the power to matter behind his thought, how much does the world today draw consciously or unconsciously for its direction of ideals upon the many wise and subtle philosophers of 1960? Though interesting for illustration and quotation, civilised and scholarly, I did not feel that this book made either history or Kwame Nkrumah much easier to understand.

GUY HUNTER

NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE

Written by Himself.

Ed. Benjamin Quarles

Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press, 1960. 153 pp. 28s.

In 1845 there appeared a short account of his life written by a young mulatto, who had been a slave in Maryland and had recently escaped. Launched with a preface by William Lloyd Garrison and with a commendatory letter from Wendell Phillips, the book was

certain of success in abolitionist circles; what was less predictable was that it would become a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic. Frederick Douglass was to live for fifty years after the publication of the *Narrative*; he became the most honoured and the most influential of American Negroes, and a living repudiation of the argument that biological inferiority was the necessary result of African descent; but nothing which he did thereafter was quite so effective as his first written work. The power of the *Narrative*, which can still be felt after one hundred and fifteen years, lies largely in its style; in an age of flowery and adorned writing, when feeling was often betrayed by sentimentality, Douglass (who was largely self-taught) wrote plain, direct and vivid Anglo-Saxon prose. His indictment of slavery was the more convincing because the inhumanity which he recorded was not portrayed as the product of extraordinary misfortune or of extraordinary wickedness, but as the normal characteristic of life in a slave society. Benjamin Quarles, who has edited this edition, is justified in describing the *Narrative* as 'one of the most arresting autobiographical statements in the entire catalogue of American reform'. The Belknap Press of Harvard University has done well to add this reprint to its collection of rare works about the American past; it is of more than antiquarian interest.

W. R. Brock

RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW

By JACK GREENBERG

Columbia University Press, 1959. 481 pp. 80s.

There used to be only one watershed in the history of the American South—the 'War Between the States'. Today, judging by the way Southerners talk, there is a second, the School Segregation Cases decided by the Supreme Court on 17 May 1954. Before 1954, it would seem, relations between whites and Negroes were pleasant and easy-going. Now there are tension and mistrust—thanks to Chief Justice Warren and his associates.

Anyone who reads one of the texts on American government or constitutional law is aware that this is a fanciful picture. The school cases were part of a series brought before the courts by Negro organisations over a period of about twenty years. The legislation which they hoped would be declared unconstitutional had been introduced by State legislatures throughout the South in the period 1890 to 1925, a period which began with an imperialist United States opening the door to trade in China and ended with the closing of the door to immigration. As the pendulum in the North swung once more towards liberalism it was clearly only a matter of time before Jim Crow came under fire.

What is remarkable about the period since 1954 is the shift of interest from the legal sphere to the political. After the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 Congress had been reluctant to pass legislation on behalf of the Negro, partly because the Supreme Court in that year declared that there were limits to congressional powers of interference in civil rights. Now, encouraged by the Court's attitude and pressed by Northern Negroes and liberals, Congress has passed civil rights Acts in 1957 and 1958, with the prospect of more to come.

This is a good point in time to survey the response of American law to Negro efforts to end segregation. Mr. Greenberg is especially qualified for this task as one of the counsel in many of the recent cases, including the School Segregation Cases. He gives us two valuable introductory chapters on the law's capacity to bring about change and the legal doctrines which have made advance possible. He then examines nine categories of social activity: public accommodation; interstate travel; elections; employment; education; housing; criminal law; the law governing domestic relations; and the armed forces. He discusses the cases which have been brought and the complicated legal position governing them. As a lawyer's contribution to the literature on American race relations his book is impressive in its thoroughness and for non-lawyers it is an indispensable work of reference.

It is of course an American book for Americans and much of it will baffle foreigners unaccustomed to American legal procedures. The English reader will welcome the occasional reference to the common law but may be surprised at its inadequacy in the United States. A coloured man must be admitted to a fashionable London hotel because legally it is an inn; in California 80 per cent. of the hotels and motels are estimated to refuse admission to Negroes. Mr. Greenberg knows his law and willingly explains it, but he is no Jeremy Bentham eager to reform the whole structure. If his attitude is typical of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People it is not surprising that more militant groups are springing up to challenge its legalistic approach to race relations.

The most serious shortcoming of this admirable, scholarly work is that there is no attempt to add up the contents of the nine chapters and to assess the Negro's present position in general terms. The 110 pages of appendixes, bibliography and index are not a substitute for a conclusion to match his introductory chapters. But perhaps Mr. Greenberg would retort that the subject is so vast and so changeable that any general conclusion would be misleading.

Douglas V. Verney

THE CHINESE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

By ROSE HUM LEE

Oxford University Press for the Hong Kong University Press, 1960. 465 pp. 52s. 6d.

This is likely to become the standard authority on the Chinese in America for years to come. It contains answers to most of the questions likely to be asked about this community. Its total numbers were estimated at 135,000 in 1958 (the census figures for 1950 and 1940 were 117,629 and 77,504 respectively), and there are Chinese in every state of the Union, ranging in 1950 from 58,324 in California and 20,171 in New York to 34 in Vermont. The great majority of them originate from eight only of the ninety districts of one province of China, namely Kwangtung. They are by no means homogeneous, however, and, sociologically speaking, the author divides them into sojourners (i.e. those whose mental orientation is towards their home country), students and intellectuals, and the American-Chinese. Of the 35,000 Chinese in the San Francisco-Oakland Metropolitan Area in 1950, 22,000 were native-born and 13,000 foreign-born. Only about 9,000 of all the Chinese in the U.S.A. are Christians (6,000 Protestants; 3,000 Catholics).

The question the reader of this Journal is most likely to ask is how far are the American-Chinese assimilated to their country of adoption? Intermarriage with Americans is very rare. American-born Chinese are automatically U.S. citizens; alien-born Chinese could not be naturalised until 1943. Race is no longer the barrier it once was, and the reluctance to integrate is at the present time on the side of the Chinese. A great many Chinese want a firmer place in American society. 'If there were not "Two Chinas" the necessity to integrate remains but would be less urgent.' The Americans have shown their good will by removing the barriers to assimilation one by one, but they still have some way to travel in regarding American-Chinese as fellow citizens and disregarding their ancestry.

This book is an important work of reference for the student of race relations, and Rose Hum Lee (Mrs. Gleen Gin) is to be congratulated on its scope and thoroughness.

VICTOR PURCELL

THE CHINESE IN NEW ZEALAND

A Study in Assimilation

By NG BICKLEEN FONG

Hong Kong University Press, 1959. 145 pp. 30s.

The Chinese are usually ignored in studies of race relations in New Zealand, yet Chinese immigration began in the middle of the last century when gold was discovered in Otago and a small community on the fringes of white society has been there ever since. Until the Second World War they were treated with suspicion and, at times, open hostility for they were considered to be the advance guard of that 'Yellow Peril' which worried New Zealanders as well as Australians. The entry of Chinese was governed by a series of restrictive laws in the Australian and American style and little interest was shown in the problems of their adjustment to New Zealand life. But there has been a change in the last decade; since 1952 Chinese have been granted naturalisation if they wish it and they are able to play a greater part in the life of the nation. Their cultural assimilation is beginning. Young Chinese find it easier to get jobs which are more rewarding than their traditional occupations in laundries, market gardens and fruit shops, and at the same time they are turning away from the institutions and values of Chinese family and social life which their parents brought with them from the mainland.

The younger people have nothing Chinese about them except their looks and a white businessman told the author of this book, 'You Chinese used to work 18 hours a day, but the young Chinese now are as lazy as New Zealanders.'

This concise book begins with a brief history of the Chinese community and goes on to explain in sociological terms its present day structure and status. Particularly interesting are some transcripts of interviews with first and second-generation Chinese and a sociometric survey in Dunedin schools with Chinese pupils.

The gloomy aura of a post-graduate thesis lingers about the book, particularly in the chapter on sociological theory, but it is a valuable contribution to a little-known field of race relations.

DONALD WOOD

THE PLEASURES OF EXILE

By GEORGE LAMMING

London, Michael Joseph. 229 pp. 21s.

The decline of imperialism has been accompanied by the growth of a literature produced by former colonial peoples. Nowhere has this development reached such peaks as the British West Indies which in the last decade has produced some fifty novels by a dozen

novelists. The most highly acclaimed is George Lamming, and his views on the cultural effects of colonialism, on both the colonisers and colonised, are worthy of serious consideration.

In this book Prospero and Caliban are his symbols (Prospero the colonist, Caliban the slave), and he sets out to give, primarily, an account of the reasons why these West Indian writers feel compelled to leave their islands and settle, mainly, in Britain. Necessarily he gives useful clues on West Indian attitudes towards Britain, but he also includes an analysis of *The Tempest*, an account of the life of Toussaint L'Ouverture, pieces of autobiography, and notes on other West Indian writers.

This could have been a fascinating book. His analysis and description of the West Indian cultural background is admirable; his definition of colonialism as an attitude of particular ways of regarding others has useful possibilities. But his discussion is sometimes founded on flimsy evidence. There is, for example, the episode in which Lamming asks a man the way to the Tube. The man walks with him but Lamming doesn't like the look of a street they are about to enter, and asks two policeman the way. They offer a different route which Lamming takes. At the station the man, obviously annoyed, is waiting for him. He tells Lamming that he is never going to speak to a coloured man again. The incident is trivial, and tells us little except one man's attitude on race relations. Yet it is used to generalise about the colonial attitudes of the English middle class. This is absurd, as absurd as Lamming's obtuseness in not realising that he himself was being mildly rude.

Such trivia, and there are many, mar what is otherwise a profound, humane, and witty personal document. The writing is often pleasurable and illuminating, although it is so overlaid with symbolism that the result is often obscurity rather than clarity. Mr. Lamming's reputation as a writer of distinction will not suffer from the deficiencies of this book, but it is a pity he did not spend more than two months writing it.

HAROLD POLLINS

THE TESTING OF NEGRO INTELLIGENCE

By AUDREY M. SHUEY

Lynchburg, Virginia, J. P. Bell, 1958. 351 pp. 30s.

In the introduction to this book, Dr. Shuey refers to seventeen representative textbooks in general psychology published during the last decade. She says: 'All of the authors have taken a common point of view represented by such statements as: intelligence tests presuppose a common cultural and educational background which does not exist . . . etc.'; the majority consider the racial results to be inconclusive; some, she goes on, are more vigorous in denouncing the assumption that there are racial differences in intelligence between Negro and white peoples. It soon becomes clear that her own views are very different from those of the majority; she finds a remarkable consistency in the test results, 'whether they pertain to school or pre-school children, to high school or college students, to drafts of World War I or World War II', and her conclusion is that there are 'some native differences between Negroes and whites as determined by intelligence tests'.

Dr. Shuey's industry in amassing statistics cannot be brushed aside and her view will seem compelling to a reader who has not seen the other side of a controversy in which her own part can be stated quickly. She is not so simple as to believe that all whites are more intelligent than all Negroes but she does find that the Negro averages are everywhere less than the white averages and that the number of Negroes who exceed the white norm is slight; these are the figures and in her view they make out a case that has not been convincingly refuted.

The other side of the controversy is more complex and cannot be stated in such simple terms. The first massive use of intelligence testing was in the armed forces of the United States in the First World War. These first tests put the American-born white citizens of the United States well ahead of immigrants and still further ahead of Negroes. But it was soon realised that immigrants whose native language was not English and Negroes had alike suffered a disability in respect of language. The tests involved ability to understand sentences in English and to express thought; the handicap of those whose native language was not English was obvious and the Negro too usually came from a home where the English spoken was not standard American and where the vocabulary was small. As intelligence testing made progress, a further handicap appeared. If linguistically the disability of the foreign-born immigrant seemed the more severe, there was also a social handicap which operated more sharply in the case of the Negro.

The Negro is pictured by many white American citizens as poor and dirty, as ignorant, impulsive and unreliable; therefore he does not get the job when there is a white applicant; therefore he continues to be poor; therefore he lives in a poor house in a squalid neighbourhood; therefore he is in fact dirty and poor—as he was supposed to be. This vicious circle in relation to housing and jobs is matched by another in school. Here the teacher forms the impression that a child is slow or stupid; this impression may be nothing to do with views on race, but, if the teacher is prejudiced, the first glance at a Negro child may

give rise to it. Only the best teachers can avoid letting it be seen that not much is expected from certain children—and the achievement of these children will be just what was expected. Put an apparently dull child under a teacher who shows confidence and appreciation and very different results will often appear. That this kind of vicious circle operates in relation to the Negro in the United States has long been recognised; it is brought out in great detail in Myrdal's classic *An American Dilemma*. In the Northern States, there have been great changes in the last fifteen years but even in the North the Negro is still held in disesteem, it is still hard for him to get the kind of job and the kind of success that generally win respect and it is surely to be expected that this will be an important factor in the results of intelligence tests. Almost all psychologists except Dr. Shuey agree that in fact it is. The child who feels that he belongs to the community and has a chance of success tries harder at school and seems brighter in tests.

The subject cannot be discussed without mention of Dr. Otto Klineberg, who, after a life devoted to intelligence testing, has said that the history of the subject is one of progressive disillusionment as to the possibility of disentangling native or innate intelligence from that which a person has acquired from his background, his education and his general circumstances. It makes, incidentally, for clarity to speak of inherited or genetic ability as intelligence A and the end-product, the intelligence which a person displays after years of experience, as intelligence B. Dr. Klineberg and his school consider that while testing cannot disentangle intelligence A from intelligence B and thus provide a fair test between groups with different backgrounds, it is legitimate to make deductions from comparing results obtained where the backgrounds are more different and where they are less different. Thus he compares results in the Deep South of America, where there are segregated schools and no one pretends that there is equality of opportunity, with those in the North, where these factors are much less important. The averages grow nearer together as between Negro and white as the samples move northward and in the larger cities, and particularly Los Angeles and New York, are almost equal. Indeed, in one famous study in the public (*anglice*, state) schools of New York by Drs. Peterson and Lanier the results were almost identical.

How does Dr. Shuey deal with this argument? She does not deny that there is a difference in the results of intelligence testing between Northern and Southern Negroes. She thinks it is about nine points on the Binet I.Q. system. Half of this she thinks is perhaps due to environment and the other half to 'selective migration'. This refers to the theory that those who migrate from the South are the more intelligent and enterprising, while those who stay behind are the stupid and idle. It can however just as plausibly be argued that those who succeed in the South stay where they are, while the failures move North. There are in fact studies on this very point which indicate the likelihood—Dr. Klineberg would put it higher than this—that these two arguments are both correct but cancel each other out. It seems to your reviewer that Dr. Shuey has the worst of this argument and that if 'selective migration' is a factor, it is a small one.

Let us look at Dr. Shuey's method of dealing with conclusions she finds unpalatable, for example the work already referred to of Peterson and Lanier in New York. In this study, the average scores were almost identical for white and Negro at seventy-four, though there was a difference of nearly three points in the white favour between medians, that is the midmost point between best and worst. Dr. Shuey draws attention to the fact that half the parents of the white children were foreign-born and one third of the white boys came from non-English-speaking homes. If all the children from foreign-speaking homes were eliminated, the white performance was improved and the difference in *medians* becomes nearly six points. She does not give the difference in *average* that would result. She concludes: 'the reviewer does not consider these studies to have been a significant contribution to the study of racial differences'. Here it will be seen that while she has rightly paid attention to the linguistic handicap, she has disregarded the handicap of esteem; her conclusion may seem a trifle arbitrary.

Let us take another example. When it was first realised that intelligence testing was not quite as simple as it had first seemed, it was thought that tests which did not involve the use of words but a drawing of something generally known would be 'culture-free' and therefore much fairer as between people of different cultures. A study by Dr. Florence Goodenough was published in 1926 recording tests in which the task set was to draw a man. This confirmed the previous differences between Negro and white intelligence. In 1950 however Dr. Goodenough published an article in which she recognised that this early work of hers was based on assumptions that she no longer accepted; the test was in fact not free from the influence of previous upbringing. There have for example been tests in which American Indians and white people have been asked to draw a man and a horse; the city-bred whites were found to score better than the Indians on drawing a man, which involved conventions to which they were accustomed, but they failed lamentably over the horse, on which the Indians scored better marks for intelligence. This surely is the kind of point which in a review such as Dr. Shuey's should be discussed. But though the work of Dr. Goodenough in 1926 is mentioned a number of times and shown in various tables in the course of this work, the article of 1950 in which she recanted from her previous opinion is mentioned only in a footnote to a brief acknowledgement in the text that the test was not wholly 'culture-free'. This reviewer is bound to reach the conclusion that the survey is not free from bias.

In general, the two outstanding—and in, your reviewer's opinion, damning—criticisms of this book are, first, the writer's neglect of esteem as a factor in the results of intelligence testing and secondly the fact that for Dr. Shuey the human species is confined between the eastern and western seaboards of the United States and the borders of Canada and Mexico. There is however a world outside. One small piece of evidence to be set beside Dr. Shuey's laborious statistics is a statement made to your reviewer by the Headmaster of the Harrison High School in Barbados: 'Yes, we do sometimes get a white boy who is up to the academic standard of the black, but only occasionally.' He recognised that this was due to environment; the white boys had businesses or plantations to go to and had little need to do well at school, while the black came from professional homes and would have to make their way in the world by their professional achievement as doctors, lawyers and civil servants. There are other factors, too, some of which can hardly be discussed in a short review. The basic fact remains that in this big high school the black do much better than the white. To take that fact as proof of racial difference would be as sensible as to accept Dr. Shuey's conclusions.

PHILIP MASON

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

The Marriage of Gor. By Jenn Lawrie. London, Gollancz, 1960. 18s.
A Survey of Rent Paying Capacity of Urban Natives in South Africa. Pretoria, South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, 1960. 15s.
The Peoples and Policies of South Africa. By Leo Marquard. London Oxford University Press, 1960. 30s.
The Last Enchantment. By Neville Dawes. London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1960.
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Indian Affairs in Colonial New York. By Allen W. Trelease. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. 54s.

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